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these iects halterl or tel:" ielatec. Tr.e 
c':'vi~ian <ldmi:,ist:::atioil in 3:::-6:':'1 is supporting an 
am.:Jig'JollS ane 'J:lco:npro:ni.sing pos:::ion by not. :-ati::::inq 
sig:1i:icar.t ag:"eer..en;-.5 reno.lncing TI'Jclear 'Neapon'J 
v,'it:1 ]razi~ 5til~ rejecting tr.e ~on- P::-o~iferation 
1':::-eat_1' (:;rP'T) r,ot forrrally e!:'_bJ:"dcing the Tlatclolco 
:':-eat::J(w:-tich prohibits nuelea::- weapons in :..,atin America), 
ar.d :lOt a~~owing :'J11 imp~emer.tation of inspectioC15 and 
Irterr.ational Atomic Er.erg"/ Association (IA::;A) Safeguards or. 
its :1uc~ear faci~i.t_ies, t::f! future 0: the R[azi~ian r1'-.lc1ea:: 
p:::og::-am appea::-s to be a co!":--ar.t DJt poter:tia~ politica:' 
facto::- ir" BraziL.a:1 fore-=--gr. policy. 
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COmILl:l i st 
dcq:JisitiO:1 0: 
a de'.-eloping cour.t:::-y or a 
aligned" nation is keepieg t~e nor.-pro~i:e:::a:.ion reg-'-mes r,n a 
a.ert, ~OOy;:illg for po:.eetia~ offende:s. 'Ir.e p·J:pose 
0: :':lic; :.r.esis .'-s "to exa~.ine :.r.e case of a de',-e':'opll:g na:.ior. 
La:-.ir. an active aed advar.ced 
·:eapons program. logic is "to r-e'liew ::.r.e C-.lrrenL 
's:.at.c:.s q'-.lO" ar.d a:nbigc.o·-.ls policies :.r.at L'le 3razi':'id:l 
du:.r.or-':""!:.ies dr'e £ollowir.g ie 11latte:::s CO:lCeL1ir.g !lonp:::-o':'iferat':on 
legis':'aLio:l a;-[d :.ecl:r.ologica~ autor_omy requireme;1:-.S. This 
ide:1tif i es five ceLermir.d:lLs r.O· ... i they ar-e a:fec:.ir.g ~he 
o£ ar.1' ciecisi:JL1, :.r.e leader-sr.ip -'-:1 Brazil, 
related to "!:.r:e nuclear power and weapons prog:-alil ~l~ B:::azL .. 
Tr.is tLesis addresses :.r.e fo~lowillg q·-.lestions: 
I ~) :s 8:::a2i1 
car.cel its aspir-a·_ior.s [0::: a m.:clear weapor.s a:::ser.al or :'0 
p::-olifer-a:-.ior. regimes? 
-=-:;e _eaders of the 'lraz' 1 i a;"t gover;"tr"ent In'..lS': cC)i1S-'-der 
di 
prestic;e" be:ore 
Is tj-.ere a reSL:rger.ce ir. Braz'_ ::'iar. 
A m'..l'..:;a~y :::es".l:::c;ence can a catalytic fac::or :or tl:e 
ee'le~opmen:: of m:cleac p::-ogcams 'l'..a a paralle':' proqra;';", iI, 3c-az-'--
SeC'.lL_ty ane Deve~OplTe:l::, teI'I'i::or-'--a~ co:;,::rol cO:Jcerrs, 1T,'--l'..:;ac~' 
::echnolog-'--ca~ aL:tonony, geopol' ::ical 
cO:Jsiderat':"oriS, a:1d orqan~za::'..ona:" ;:>restige appea:::s to ~e-;iti 
::l:e :nilit:ary anbit::'or ::0 ha"le ::he ::ecr.r.ologica~ r;:no"o-how to 
deve~op a :1L:clear weapon. 
(3) v..'ha7_::'5 7_I"",e re~a:.::'onshi;:> between Lle Brazilian ard t:-:e 
lu--;er.t::'ne nv::::'ear p::-ogrClms? 
Past qeopo~i:.ical cons':"derations and fears of mi~it.a:::y 
corf~ic:: ir.itiated a:1 a:::-ms ::-ace bet·"'een :.he cc:.mt::-ies. 
when -::11e rela:.ionship ::Jetweer. ::r_e goverr.T".ents of B~azi~ ar_d 
J..rgentine are cor-dial, many di;?lomat.::.c issues aCld diSp'J:;es O'le::-
land, and past mi i::ary conf~icts are rese:;,::ed 'oy both nations 
(4) Wha:: econoT"ic cons~de:::a::ions :r1L:st be add:essed by 
prospective m:.clear r:atio:lS i:l tl:eir Clspi::-at':'ons to c.e,,·elolJ a 
n":,clear power and nl~clear weapons program? 
Nuc~ear rower ambition is a ve:::y cos:;~y O:1e. Tr.e finance 0: 
nuclear power p:-ogram5 and acq"~'c"it'..on of t~e related 
;car.ce a::';c thcougl: ccve:-Lles :.I:e m~l-=--ta::,y 
cO:lti'_ger.c -=--es 
Lo gO'/€rr:me:l:.'l.l 
descI"i~Rd. It ':'ce:lti£':"es a:1d analyses L_ 'e determ':":1ac s 
COC.OLov'.ceq fact'Jrs 
. l:a':: are t~cse ,:"ssJe areas. -:-:"18 basic 
propOSlLiO:1 oi :_"1is ar.alys':"s a::-g'~les t:lat Brazil has a 
ager.da·' ~el:i:1d i<:s cel'-lctance to assume a clea:c and d':"rect. 
app:oacl-'_ to r.-Jclear demands f~'om t:'1e :1on?rolife::,atio~, regimes: 
fJct.:1ec its tech:101oqical ac.:onomy s:categy a:ld ma'.nta',r. tr.e 
?ot.eEt_:al ot ":Javi:1g tl:e 80mb as a Dar-qai:1 
ir. ::-.e i:-or.tli:les of internat':"o:lal c:or.s':"der-atioJ:s. 
(1) Brazil c')r:tir.ues :0 exhibIt d:1 amb':"guous 
IT,a:.:e::'s CO:lce::-:ling the nuclea::: power scc:o:::" because 1: 
0: 
best i;Jterest of a:-az1lid;J to dea~ w'_ r:r. issues 0: 
,::ecr_noloqicCll au:onomy, r.atio:1al ~Goecc'qooo, and c:eveloprGe:1'::al 
s~::ategy ~:-posed from oc:-;;s~de ac-;;or:o CO:lr,;::es'Oior.al is.:ld 
:,ar.y 
tr.a~ 
could ;)e as 
dev.:..ce itself. 
:-d].c':'ear ::-easse55meE~ betweer. t:le A::ger.t~:le a:ld 
Brazi 1 ia:l goverr.me:lt ar;d tr,e :lor.p:-oliferat~O:l reqimes a::-e gooe. 
to cO:ltrol r.~lc':'ea:: proli':eratior. ir. bo':.r. countries, bl:t 
t:-:ese ef:orts ca:l be bypassed b'" CO'fert pro~ra~s ir. o::c.e.:-
3at~sfy geopolitical :leeds or dor:es-::ic cO:lsideratio:ls, 
(3) T~e m':'li:.ary ir.:':'c:er,ce 1:l 3:-azil's poli::ical 
a[)pears to be i:lcreClsing as -;;~e econor..ic s~tc:at_ioll IlCl':;':;OWS U:e 
t:'le C'.1cce:lt socioeconomic cri'Ois and 
cor.:-upt.ion scandClls weaken tr,e ci·:':'lian leadersl:ip. 
(4) Brazil :la5 detec:nined :'0 cO:ltinue its 
,",owe1:" p::oqram wi:.r.out :'eno'.1:lc~ng to ?::i:lc~ples of tec~noLog~cal 
autor.omy and national sovereiqnty for delica::e issues ':'ike the 
pote:ltial 0: nuc':'ear weapons c.evelopmer.:, 
I. INTRODUCTION 
resea:'c.": a:ld 
atomic DO!:','::; proCjram !las beec tr.o ce[:~ed oroject 0':' ::I".e 
examp~e of tl:e great tec!lno~ogica1 c.:ld mi~'--tary pote:lt~a~ 0'::: 
r.a1::' of tbo, 
aqreemp.r.t and po~i ~he c ·.·i~ia:l go"/e:-nment 
was impl'--catec in a correption sca:lda~ tr.at sL...r.taced 
i::,~rediatell' p~io:::- ::0 tr.e ~U:le _99;J Ea:::-th S IUllrr it , 
character '--zed as a fortui T.OUS magnet t:lat drow atte:1::'--o:l 
away frar:. the :?reside:l::'s pro;l~ems. Wi"Ch s::~l~ tt:ree ,'ears 
0:' his "Cerm a!:ea.d of _'lim, E:::-aziiia:l Preside:1t ,'ornando 
Co~lor de Me~lo resig:1ed his posit'--o:l a:ld vice presidenl 
TtarT,ar ;,.ugusl_o Cautiero Franco beca:Je president. 
':::'!le '--mp~icaT.'--ons of c.e Me1~0's res'--gna"Cio:l for 
L'le Brazil'--an nuc~ear ·.weapons program \o,'erf' :lore 
CO:l?ro~: fe::-at'..O:l 
a,d :~ooper-at_iO:l co:-:prOJClSeS tLat '"ere :;Clde 
:t seems ::hat tne adm'..:lis::rat.:..on of presirier.t 
Frar.co '..5 those cO["lJTt':'tmccts :::-om Cl eiif:el:ent. 
Bra;::i:C still re:eccs the ~or. ,'roliferatio:l -:;:reat~' 
anei has :o:"mal:.. J, enoraced the Tlatelolco ':'reat~', 
.3. r-<"sio:lal :luclear-'.ieapons-free 30:lC in Lat-'-r. 
A.J~,e::-'..ca. :list"JrDir.g drr.b':"c;uit'..es pe:-s'..st ::-ec;ardiru; certa'..:1 
~:-:diger.o"Js :luclear :'3cil~t'..es a:lei grolo'':':19 n~lclear 5u;:'Il".Clr':':le 
a:ld m:"ssile pr-ogram. though Brazil a:ld Arser.ti:la ha'le 
s:"g:led a new arrar.qement :::or ::-utual ir,specticEs and :LAEA 
Safeguards of rmclear :::ac-'-~:"tiesf the agreenent has not beer. 
ratified by either cation's :"egislatt:r-e. 
Now B::-azil faces tr.e dilemrr.a 0: decidiEg w~etr.er to 
ca,~cel i::s aspi:rations fo::- a r:c.clear weapon arse:1al or ::0 
cO:1tinue a moderate D"J"::: decisive program leadir,g towards tl:e 
sradc.a 1 develop:nent of a n-Jclea::- explosive device. 
thes':'s a:la:"yzes t'le Bcazil:an r.uclea::- 9ro9ra::-. and the 
:actors ~r.at ·,.:ill determ::le ;ts :uture as par~ of tte mcce 
er.compassing cational pol:"cy strategy ':':1 B::-azil. 
g~O;Jdl ~:!:"er.cs- r.on-;:;ro i:crdt':"on regimes, 
ur:al arms 
t.he reilSOr.s behir.c the course 0'::: ,o.ctior.s 
by t:le Braz':"lia:l gO·Jer:1l1l8nt ':"n 8ilt.tcrs concerr.ir.g t:1e 
deve~opme:lt 0: t~,e r.·.lclear '.~eapor.s proqra:u. 
two major c;c.estioniO. 
ii,s"'. or.e assurr.eiO the terr..ir:2.tio:l 0: t.he 
weapO:ls program ':"n Braz':'_. What '.'Jere t:,e facto:::s 
:~uenc':":lg t]-.e decis':'or. to te:::2i:1ate t::e nuclear weap0:ls 
prcg:-am ~:l 3raz':'l'? The 
prGg:::am tas occul"ced as a resc:.lt 0: a praq.na-:':"c dec':'s':'oCl 
ttat ssues of: 
(:) "i:lte::.-rational cost"- tr,e cost 0'::: opposlng g~o[)a~ 
t.re:lds, U.S. ' ..... iiO:-:eS, and ~nternationa: Systems 0: 
Nuclear Control l':'Ke L'le r.i\.EA, t:PT, ar.d C'late.Lolco 
':"s ;:00 tigr., 
12; 
of 
ar_c ir.flue,c:ial elemer.::s ir. Gomes::::.c ar.c 
rorelgr: of Brazil, 
::r.e 
·.lrcisputed 
3::-az:'liar. ?o~itics, :':1 acdit:'or_ to a 
that appears :'0 exis::s ',.ri::!lin Brazilia:l 
goverr.:-;ent tra:ls::ormir.g cO:lgressional ir.to 
time" game, and 
(5) :nilitary Amazonia:l Sec~:ri ty 
:nitiat.ive r.as replaced nuc~ear ""eapons development 
and , .. ieapons tec:"1no~ogy acql.lisi::ion as :::"1e 3razilian 
militarv',; :crission. 
secor.d questio:l does not eli:-::':late t.te 
r.·.lclea~· v.,eapon deve~opmer.:: b'..lt_ tie,; it_ to :lation2.~ 
seCl.lri::y po~ic:"1 domes:..ic 90_i::ical ca~cc.lat::ions, and tte 
'.;10::1a1 ;"loii::ica1 env.:xonrr.en::i emp:'lasizing 
t:le ':':lter:1a::ional stage: Is ttere a r.idden acenc.a he.lind ::~je 
rel·.lctance of tte 3::-az1 ian governmen:. to aSSl.lmc a CO:lc-e::e 
and clear position concerning tr.e r.l.lc1eac "'caoon sec-or l:l 
(1) to f-lrt_1er -'--3sl~es 0:- t:ecl:lo~oc;iLal a,,:.ono::lY 
benef~::: tJ::-eser.t a~ld 
po,"-iticill :;y 
inte::-fe:ence _S ilffectiI:g issl:es of 
concept ot "g:-andeza. ' ar.d the 
i r_ B:az':'lian 
_ :"",e :lOn-Dlr_c:":1g 
c:nc '::0 defe:ld 
:he 
at the mi -'--ta::-y 
to posit':'on B::azil advan:ageo~15 but tempo::-a::-y 
""-'--thin tr.e ir.terna:::i(")na~ stage 
iJ.:1d a:fa i::s. 
This thesis analyzes the 8razi l':an nuclear op':lon in 
Sl;pport of a proposed argurcen: t_hat a:-gues tr_at 8::azil has il 
hidden agenda behind its nuclea!:' "bomb" p'::-OC;'::-iJ.Ill: ':'0 fu:-ther 
its tecJ,nolog-'--cal a'-ltoI~O:n:,' :;triltegy ar.d usc the "pote7ltial 
of r_dving tr_e bor..b as il ba.::-gain chip" as long as it is 
?e.::-miss-'--ble and ::easible -'--r. B::-o.z'l's dOlT'es::ic a:ld foreign 
':::le me:::L8dology -lsed :':1 :::1e ::eseCl.rc!~ 01 
as assoc:'at:'or.al ar;a~ysL,. 'C':-.is meL:l0d :'s I sed 
Cl.:1colys::s 0: 
tecf.:1i'::pe ir. the a:1a:"ysis of political-i:-:'li::a:::-y di':'er,unas. 
1'~is tecl-.:-;ig·-le helps ::0 iden::iiy OO''''''0on"eo 
governme:ltdl polic:'es and a:"d in :-.r.e .lnderstand:'ng 0: 
o:'de:' cO:lseqc:.ences of in the process beinc; desc:"lbed. 
a:osociationa:" analysis :'s a ve::y -lse:=c.:" 
t.ool :'t not be .1eavily re':'':'ed to provide 
p::oDaDilisL.'..C anS'Ners Lo conf':'_ctual situation3. 
Tn surruna:-y, :::1is t:les:'s analyses fi'/e iss·.le ar:-eas 
ir.tirFate':'y related ::0 ':he n'Jc':'ea~' secto:: in Brazil and 
:ce~ates t:lem to the poss:'oil:'Ly 01. Li Iluc':'ear weapons 
reapproachment in Br:-az.ilian policy. The fir:-s-. three 
c:1ap::ers (II, III and IV) are a descr':'ptive analysls of 
Treaty of T:'ate~olco, the Inte:::-nat:,o:1al AtOFic Er.e:·gy(i..!,EA", 
Sa:eguarc.s, end a histor:-:'cal rev:'ew of ::he deve:"o;Jment. of 
the 3cazilian Nuclear program. :ssue a:ceas ar-e t:"1er; 
atrr,os"r.ere in ~otr, a:lC cO:ltiL.1eS to be a catalyst 
fo:::- fl:ncarr,ental cha:lge 11' : r.e 3~a;::':'lia:l 
r.t;clea, option. C:"lapter V = maiI:tains ::hat t:le developmer,t 
key 
s::,ategy of cecr.nolo<;ical 
econoi:1ica: develcp;:tent ane. ~eql:'..~es la' .... :-1akers ar.c staLesmen 
to consider· t~e sacrifices necessary to finance '..ts 
developmect. :'~e a'la':'lab':'li::y o[ foreign capita~ via 
ir,::e,natio:1al ':'oar.s or '#eapons p,lrchases '"las made econo:nic 
cons'..cerations ar,d h:ndir.g ir.C;l:i:::-y less costly for" t:,e 
3razil':'iln plnnr.ers. Chapter '.'~-;-= ("lairr,s :;hat i:1flL:.ence 
o[ tr.e :nilitary-tr.at B:'azi':",; milita::y "corporate 
still inti'.1ences policy decisions at L1e '"liSher le'le15 of 
civi1ia:-l go·,,·e,cnenc in 8ra2'..1. Tr.e developrr,e:1t 0':' an atomic 
bo[":"b ~as !:Jeer. pact of a :nilita::y "grand" strategy it: orde:: 
to f'clrtter ':'saues sovere':'gnty ':'ncependel1ce [or t~e 
las:: two c.er.ac.es. Chapte:: ~x cries to ao;se~'t c~at cl-.e 
p:::-oliferatioc reg':'mes can he "Dypassed" ei::r.er the'..r own 
cer.eg8tia:.ion of ClUJ -pro ife:c-atiur. 
"IO'Jld also 8f:ec some 
BraZl~ia:J 
s st:udy 
s~lmrna=-i2ed if'. C!"apt:ers X 
II. HISTORY OF THE TREATY Of' TLATELOLCO 
In the early 1960s, the effort to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America began 
unde:::- the leadership of Brazil. In 1961, Brazilian 
President Joao Goulart sent a draft resolution to the United 
Nations General Assembly proposing the creation of a nuclear 
weapons-free zone in Latin America. Brazil feared that any 
regional acquisition of nuclear weapons would stimulate an 
extremely expensive and dangerous arms race. Goulart stated 
that because no nuclear weapons were present in the region, 
their introduction would be destabilizing. 
Goulart was Brazil's president from August 1961 until 
the March 1964 military coup. Despite the growing tensions 
between Goulart (a civilian) and the military, the Brazilian 
armed forces supported his initial anti-nuclear stance 
because they feared Argentina's technological advantages in 
nuclear research. However, after the coup, the Brazilian 
enthusiasm for a nuclear weapons-free zone declined under 
the first military president, General Humberto Castello e 
Branco.' 
The initial Argentine reaction to Goulart's proposal 
was skeptical. However, the rest of Latin America received 
2Bo livar Lamounier, "Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy," 
in Diamond, Linz and Lipset, Eds., Democracy in Developing 
Countries, pp.124-l26. 
the proposal with enthusiasm. Cuba eagerly supported the 
proposal. Cuba amended the proposal to include Puerto Rico 
and the Panama Canal Zone. Cuba called for the removal of 
all foreign military bases from Latin America (especially 
the U. S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay). The United 
States opposed the Cuban amendment and exerted pressure on 
the United Nations General Assembly not to vote on the 
resolution during 1961. 3 The Cuban missile crisis 
demonstrated the destabilizing potential of nuclear weapons 
and fueled fears of dangerous nuclear proliferation in the 
region. Many Latin American nations feared being drawn into 
the rage of a superpower conflict.4 In 1963, President Joao 
Goulart initiated the Five President's Declaration calling 
for a nuclear weaponS-free Latin America. The presidents of 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico signed the 
declaration. First, they believed that the absence of 
nuclear weapons would reduce the danger of being targeted 
with nuclear weapons by either superpower. Second, they 
thought the introduction of nuclear weapons might cause 
3Atkins, Latin America in the International Political 
System, p.337. 
4The Soviet union made a pledge following the Cuban missile 
crisis not to place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. However, 
nuclear-capable ships and aircraft of the Soviet union have made 
regular port visits in Cuba. See William M. Arkin and Richard W. 
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race 
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s-lspL:ior_s c:: 'L"azl:. tLe saDe t':'me, ::::le 3:"azi-
m':'litary adoptee.! "Joct-:-ir_e c: ~Jatio:lal Secc.rit_y.' 
econo:nic po~icYI illt_erna~ sec.:rity, a:ld sc.ppressioc c: 
le!:t'-st op:;Jositioc \ The milic:ary governments 
bo::h _~rc;-enti:la a:1d Bra::il :eteede ::ational sec-lrity iss-les a 
top priority, c=eatiLg a cyc:e of dist:n:st bet'/;ee:J 
ttesc 
creaty :1egotiatior.s took :no:'e c:ha:1 two years 
beca'-lse 0: d':'sagree:nent.s over transit Lights fol' I:Lc':'ea:::--
ca?able ships anc airc:ca:t. The second reason :or the 
prolonged negot:':"atio:ls concerned t:h"" entrv .into fore",," 
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a:rc:::-af:. ~i:.:.ec :r.e -:ni:.ea Sta~e", 
aqau.s:. of ~atin A.tTer:car. :.'1e 'Jr.~ted 
State:.: or. f:reedo:u tor s:lips ar.d a~rc:::-aft 
''''ea~ons ~.o :.rar.s:t. ::.'11"OL.g!-. La:.:.:l "':lle:-~ca. !·!a:ly 
La:ir. :::-epreser.':.ati'fes at tr.e ::.:::-ea::.'{ 
claimed ::.r.at t:-te r-'::li::.ed Sta-:.es gove:::-:lmer.t ~os-=--tion 
::.r.e entire PC::'Fose 0: t.'1e :rea:.y. c:'he l~ex:..ca:l 
de~eya:.e,-, adamar:t :ha:: U.S. sr.·lps ca:::-::-yi:lg l~c.clear 
in La~.ir. rlme::-ica:l '.·;ate::-s W01.:1d be a gross 
the :nte'lt 0-: a Llclea:::- '.~eapo:ls-free zone. t ':!'he U.S. 
c.elegates ',.'e:::-e, l'cowe'/e:::-, s'-,ccessfu~ in er.suring L'1at tr.e 
:::-ea:y allowec ::!-.e free tra:lsit of sh:ps and a:rc:::-af::: 
tr.:-oug:10l:t the :-egion. ':!'r.e Cnite'j St<".c::.es 
its of "neithe;::- coniir:niny cor de:lying" (~CND) 
pceser.ce 0: nuclear 'Neapons on any of 1:s ships or 
ai::-craf-c. 7 
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The second poir.t 0:: conten'::ion duri::lg the trea'::y 
negotiations concerr.ed the "entry into force" provisions. 
treaty "e:lters into force" when a party to the treaty 
completes the ratiiicatior:. process. The signing of the 
treaty document is only the first step. Ratification by the 
nation's legislature is also required. 
The distrust between Argentina and Brazil made each 
unwilling to allow the treaty to become effective until the 
other complied '."ith all treaty obligations. Brazil would 
not comply with the treaty until Argentina completed the 
ratification process, and Argentina made a similar demand. 
Therefore, Article 28 requires the ratification of the 
treaty by every Latin American nation before ':he treaty can 
enter into force. The treaty allows individual signatories 
to waive the entry into force provision. Of the 26 
signatories, only three have refused to waive this 
provision: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. s 
Treaty ratification is a two-step process. First, each 
nation must deposit "an instrument of ratification" with the 
treaty organization office in Mexico that documents 
legislative approval of the pact. Second, the signatory 
nation must complete safeguard negotiations with <;;.he IAEA. 
SEdmund Jan Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United 
Nations and International Agreements (Philadelphia: Taylor and 
Francis, 1985), p.805. 
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As a result of Article 28, ~he Treaty of Tlatelolco has not 
prevented the pursuit of nuclear weapons by either Argentina 
or Brazil. 
Despite these two important limitations, the Treaty for 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was 
signed on 14 February 1967. The treaty headquarters are in 
Tlatelolco (a section of Mexico City), and the treaty is 
therefore known as the treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty 
called for the total prohibition of the use, deployment and 
manufacture of nuclear weapons in the region. The preamble 
of the treaty of Tlatelolco claimed that the military 
denuclearization of Latin America would have following 
benefits: 
"[The Treaty of Tlatelolco] will spare the peoples 
[of Latin America] from the squandering of their 
limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect 
them against possible nuclear attacks on their 
territories, and will also constitute a significant 
contribution towards preventing the proliferation of 
~~~~~:~ew~~;~~!a:~~t~.,rowerful factor for general and 
The basic treaty is only for Latin American 
signatories. It outlaws the "testing", use, manufacture, 
production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any 
nuclear weapons." The treaty allows signatories to pursue 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but requires complete 
9preamble of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Osmanczyk, The 
Encyclopedia of liN Agreements, p.8D3. 
CO:Lpli",r.ce with IAE;' safegL",rcs. Tl'. 1969, t:,e ":'reaty of 
Tlate~o:'co CO.lnc-=--:' estab:'isl:ec. :.he Orgcor.i::atior. for tr.e 
?::ohibi::io:. 0: N,lclear vleapons -=--:1 Latir: Ame::-ica (CPA':'AL) 
estab~:'.sl-.ed as an additio:1a:' control mec~.a::is[;" to complerre:1:: 
the IA,,)L OPA':'AL is far :'ess e:fective tha:1 t:,e lAEA ::Jecause 
of inadegua:::e fLncir.g. 
The ':'reaty of T:'atelolco co;:tai:.s two p:-otocols ir. 
addit-=--on to tl-.e basic docurre:1::. Pro::oco:' I "commi::s 
exterr:al states wit~. c.epende:1::: terri::ories ins-=--de ::he 20:1e 
to place :::,03e ter::-itorie3 u:1de::- ::je salTle rest::ictio:ls." 
?::-o::ocol = :'s for t~.e fO.lr l:a::i0:13 :.err-=--torial :10ldir.gs 
in Latin America: Fra:1ce, tl-.e Uni::ed Kingdom, t:,e 
Nethe::lar:ds, and the enited S::ates.~a p:-o::oco:' II asked t~.e 
~loba~ n".lclear powers to respect ::r.e ":1or.-:1Lclear status of 
:"a:.in Ame::-ica, anc not ::0 LSe or ::h:-eaten to ".lse nLclear 
weapons aga.:.nst ::hem." 1 The dec~a:-ed c;~obaJ. nuclear powers 
are the Uni:.ed S:.ates, the Soviet union, tr.e United KingdolTl, 
?rance, and China. All five of these nations :,ave signed 
and ratified Pro::ocol :1. 
'CAl~ nations (excep:: Frar:ce) wi:::, ::erritoria:' holdings in 
:..atin A.-ner:'ca :,ave ratified Pro::ocol I: The United Kingdom in 
1969, t:1e Netherlands :':1 1970, and ::ne C:1ited States i:1 1981. 
See JI.tk':'ns, La::'n America i:--. the In::ernational Political Systel":", 
p. 338. 
Lati::! A..""llerica in the International ?o:'i::ica:' 
Sys::em, 
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The L-nited Nations General Assembly enthusiastically 
endorsed the treaty on 5 December 1957. The General 
Assembly ',;as optimistic that a nuclear-free zone in Latin 
America '-"auld be easier to maintain than elsewhere in the 
Third Wor Id. 12 This optimism resulted from three factors_ 
First, the regional disputes in Latin America were not as 
likely to explode as in many other areas of the Third Wor':.d_ 
Second, the COllUTIon cultural background and growing economic 
interdependence made tensions between Latin American 
neighbors less volatile than in other parts of the globe. 
Finally, nuclear weapons have not become a part of the 
security posture of any country in the region. Therefore, 
the costs involved in the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
would discourage their development. 13 
Despite the optimism of the General Assembly, the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco has achieved only qualified success 
over the past twenty-four years _ Table I provides a list of 
the ways that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has not achieved its 
goal of creating a nuclear weapons-free continent in Latin 
America. 
120smanczyk, The Encyclopedia of UN Agreements, p.803. 
13Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan, Controlling Latin 




KHY THE TREATY Of' TLATELOLCO REMAINS INCOMPLETE 
'The United States has insisted on transit rights 
for nuclear weapons on ships and aircraft. 
b. France has not ratified Protocol I. 
Seven Nations in Latin America have not signed 
the Treaty. Of these nations, only Cuba has a 
nuclear program. The Cuban government has 
expressed its intentions to sign and comply 
with the treaty by 1995. 
d. Full-scope IAEA safeguards negotiations are not 
completed for all signatories (especially in 
Argentina and Brazil). 
Argentina has not ratified the treaty. 
Brazil and Chile have not waived "entry into 
force" provisions. 
The United States position on nuclear transit rights 
continues to be controversial in Latin America. The 
presence of any nuclear weapons in the region (even at sea) 
undermines the" spirit" of the treaty for many Latin 
Americans. The United States recently took steps to reduce 
this nuclear transit rights controversy. President Bush 
announced the withdraw and placing into storage of all 
nuclear weapons from U. S. surface ships and attack 
17 
submarines on 27 September 1991.'4 This move by President 
Bush reduces the peacetime importance of the U.S. position 
on transit rights of nuclear weapons in the region, although 
the United States may deploy such weapons at. sea in crisis 
or wartime situations. 
The French refusal to ratify Protocol I was the subject 
of United Nations General Assembly Resolution (44/104) in 
1ge9. The resolution identified France's failure to ratify 
Protocol I as an obstacle to the treaty's success .15 France 
signed Protocol I in 1979, but has failed to ratify it. 
Thus, the government of France has not pledged to militarily 
denuclearize its holdings in French Guiana, Martinique, and 
Guadaloupe. France argues that those Caribbean entities are 
integral parts of the metropole and that it has the 
prerogative to establish nuclear devices on French territory 
if it so wishes. 16 
There are 33 independent nations in Latin America. The 
basic treaty has been signed by twenty-six Latin American 
nations, leaving only seven nations that have not signed it. 
14R . Jeffrey Smith, "President Orders Sweeping Reductions in 
Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Arms," The washington Post (28 
September 1991), p.Al. 
HUN Disarmament Yearbook {Volume 14, 1989}, p.193. 
16Atkins, Latin America in the International political 
System, p.338. 
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NeiLer :1at1-0:1 lS able to bc;i~d Lv::ledr wea;:>:;>r.s. -:::'.1e treat_:: 
~an(;:Jaqe ?re-/er.ts Belize a:ld Gl:ya:ld tLe '=reatv 
r.l.~e are reSO~'/eC1. ~egor.iatio:ls axe i:l ;;rogre~s 
BeL.ze a:ld Gc;ate;-.ala O-/eI t.1e':'I' d-=-s;l.l.ted 
talkS are .l.:ldecway 
Esseqc;ibo cive::- aiso'.:.te. l'he com?~eti(l:l of 
r.egotia<:-=-or.s l~ay ~eaa to t~e of Belize a:ld Gc;yaT!a 
tr.e Tceaty of '~'~ate ~olco. 
O·.l.t of tV-ie:r:y-six -,-,ati!: America:l r.ar.io:ls t'lat :la'le 
the t:--eaty, 00:',/ e.:.gh:eeo ha?e completed 
York: 
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::;afegua:::-d r.egotia::io:1s ,-,,'':t.1 
Treaty of Ilate18':'cc placed t:':'me _lmitat.icLs ~or t:he 
com?letio:'. o~ r.ec;otiat.:.or.s Wit:1 the L:'.SA. 
Article 13-Eac:l CO:1:.rac:i::g Par::y 5:1a1.1 r:eC;:0::late 
mult':'lateral 0::- ::Ji:'ate:::-al agreeiTler.ts t:1e lr.te:::-:1at':'o:Jal 
.:'xorr.':'c e:1e::-gy Agency :0::- ap;::; ieati01 0:: its sa::eg'..la:::-ds 
i::s nuelea::- act':'\!it':er,. Eae:l COTr::::-act':':Jg Party shall 
':'1itiate r:eqotia'.:.':'on::; witj':':1. a perioJ cf ISG days afte:::- t:1e 
date of deposit 0: its ins:.rJ:nent 0: ::-a~.':'ticatior. of 
':"reaty. T:1e5e agJ:"eemer:ts ",:JaIL e:Jte:- i:1to fo::-ce, fo::- flact 
Pa::-Ly, r:ot. later ":1:a:J eig:lteen ;nont:1s aft:e:::- t:1e date ot 
':'r.itiat10:1 of sue:1 negotia::':or.s except ':'n case of unfo:::-esee-: 
c,:::-cur:lstances 0:::- fO:'ce majeU::-e. 13 
':'he t':'JT.e reguireT:'.en::s specif':'ed ':'n Article 13 aptJear T.O 
have been unrealistic because of ::he :'ong delay ':':1 
co:np:'eting r.egotiat':'ons wi:.h t)"",e IAEA. The eighteen 
s':gr.atories with active :AEA sa:eg~ard agreel:'.en::s are: 
Ba:-b2dos, Bolivia, Co~ombia, Costa ~':'ca, Dom':':Jican Re?ublic, 
Ecuado:::"", El SalvacoJ:", Guatema:'a, Honduras, J"ama':'ea, Mexico, 
Kicaraqua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, SurinarGe, "Jruguay, a"d 
·,;enezue':'a. 19 The fol_owiLg tables ?reSeE": da::a 0:1 the 
<~.gJ:"eemen'.:.s, p.804. 
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" Entry-into-force provision has not been waived, 
Source: Leonard S, Spector, Nuclear Ambitions 




STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 











Costa Rica 1970 
Cuba 
Dominica 1968 
Dominican Republic 1971 
Ecuado:::.- 1969 













St. Ch:;:"istopher 1983 
St. Lucia 1979 
Suriname 1976 
T:::: inidad/Tobago 1986 
Uruguay 1970 
Venezuela 1975 
** Nations that ::tave neither 
signed :lor ratified the Treaty 
Source: Joseph F. pi::'at:, Beyond 
1995: The futu:;:"e of the NPT Regime 
(New York: Plenum Press,1990), 61. 
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-::,r.e N?-:::' ~;; no: spec~=~ca~ -, adc;::-essec ir: 
D-1t ci grear. deg:-ee of over:ap exist Det','Ieee t:le goals of tr.e 
:r.e oeli' s~g:-latory 0: -:::'reo.ty 0:: 
-:::'la:elo1co tr.at not rati:~ed trea:y because 0: 
0: "r.ational sovere:'gnty :.:-:cepe:1::leece . 
. "-.rgentina opposes a:ly :":ltf'::-:lat:"or.al inspectior.s of 
:1uc1ear pLograj~,. :1':.1::-ir.g :rea:/ :lego:~a"C-io:ls, .'<rge:1:::"r.a 
i:.s r:"c;l:: to deve:op "peace:ul explosives 
pr0:ected by :Le :reo.:1'. 
Arge:l::iea Del:'e\;ed i: tr.e sovere~g:l r ig:lt under 
Ar:::cle 18 to "carry :r. l-1clear J :or peaceful 
pUI'[Joses." However I virtl_a~ly all ot1:e~· parties :0 :1:e 
treaty accepted t:le US. a:ld posit:"o:l t:lat. all 
euclear eX[Jlo:oi'/es have m:'li:.ary appl:'ca:.:'ons cind shoulc 
forb:'dde:l u:lder the treaty. T1"".e U.S.-Soviet i,.terpre::at:'on 
i:o Lasee. on 1<.r:.:'cle 5 of the Treaty that outlaws aLe nuclear 
explos:ves "that are ap?;::-opr:'a-::.e for wo.rl:'ke pu:·po:oeoi. 
SOme prol:'feration exper::s assume tr.a:. AHje:ltir.a's pOS:'::'O:1 
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on "peaceful nuclear explosives" was an effort to legitimize 
its effort.s to build a nuclear warhead. 
Brazil and Chile responded to the Argentine refusal to 
ratify the treaty by refusing to waive the entry into force 
provision. However, Chile (unlike Brazil) allows IAEA 
inspections at a:'l of its nuclear facilities. Until 
recently, Argentina and Brazil were unwilling to renounce 
nuclear explosions and refused to accept "full-scope" IAEA 
safeguards. This has been the primary stumb2.ing block 
preventing the completion of the Treaty of Tlatelo:'co. 
Brazil and Argentina do not allow IAEA inspections at 
certain nuclear facilities developed with "indigenous" 
technology. An end to the nuclear rivalry between Argentina 
and Brazil is essential before "full-scope" IAEA safeguards 
can be established. 
In Chapter IV this thesis examines the important role 
of nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in 
fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
Chile has expressed the desire to waive the entry into force 
provision, if Argentina ratified the treaty. Cuba would 
then be the sale Latin American nation with a nuclear energy 
program not subscribing to the Treaty. This would further 
isolate Cuba from its Latin American neighbors, possibly 
providing the leverage necessary to encourage Cuba to sign 
25 
and ::-atify the treaty. Therefore, the nuclear reapproach-
ment between Argentina and Brazil is one the most important 
step in ending the threat of nuclear proliferation in Latin 
America. 
2. 
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY ASSOCIATION (IAEA) 
SAFEGUARDS 
~'dr_da:e: :8 faci~ita:e U.e 
peace:",1 0'::: r.~clear 
IT:B:erial or :o.c' 
of t:le :"5 t.:le ':ir:-,e1y dctcc::ion of 
any di'version of 
:-topes :0 dete: any di-;erSlon by c::-catinc; 
de-_ectlon. 22 siitegca::-ds pcocedcres 0: 
c. system 0:' strict accO-.1n::ing of :c1ateI~c.~ and 
o'.'c::- certair. :nc:ear ::ecr.nologies 1i:-;,e reprocessing 
and enLic.llllenl taci 1 '--t i.C5 . The 5aieg'.:acd5 agreemer:ts a::e 
ttl' ::-c5ult of negotiations between the r;.s", 
:Jr:fo::-tl.nate~y, t.'le =AEA nego::~at~or:s 
:wt 1".1lly ac.lie\-e tr_e'--r stated o:::;jecti'1es 5afegua::ds 
agreemecn. If a natio:"! does not decIa:::e a faci:ity 
Cor.d'.1cting a:lY ::-eJated nuclear resea::-ch to be ,',art of the 
safeguards agreement, the::1 the facili::y is exempt of 
inspections a:1d sa1'egClards. 
l'here are three d-'--f:e::-en~_ :ypes of safeg-.1arcis 
ag.:-eements used oy the rAEA ::" negoti<:l.te 'Iliti a bJ5t "ation. 
22-"'e155, ",ighten -Jp or. Nuc1ea:: Chea'::e:::3," p.1::,-12. 
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ties of a~l sizes 
the host r:ation fo:::- IHEA 
establ~shes 0:111' pa:::-t~al IA:::A 
to preve:lt L"-E<:. 
ir.spect~O:lf' ",t any r.Jmber 'Jf fae lit~es 
::-eqc.ires sa::egc.a:·c.s agree:neLts basee I::1FCIRC; 66. 
A:-gent i na al~d 8:-a2':"1 have safeql:a::-cs agreerner.ts L,e 
IAEA based or. :NFC:RCj66 ::haT_ allo'~"3 eenai:1 L 
a L1i:::-d agree:-ent that :::-eqc.i:::-es f·.lll~scope 
safeguards 0: al~ r.c.c~ear faci~ities i:1 a :1atio:1. 24 '::':le 
T:::-eaty of :Joc~ProliferatiO:l of Kc;e ~ea:::- '<leapor.;;·: N?'I;· :-ec:uireG 
the fu~l-sco?e safeguarcs lJased UpO:l IN?CIRC/153 fo:::- ail it.s 
slgcato::-'e". A::-gentind and 3razil :la\'e not signed the N?T 
and l":a'le :refused full-scoFe safegua::-ds ag:::-eeIlLer.t tr.e 
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IAEA because tJ.ey believe them to be an infringerr.ent on 
tr.eir sovereignty. 
B\.:t IAEA safeguards have gained international 
acceptance since the agency creation on 29 July 1957. In 
1962, t:1e United States gave the IAEA the responsibility for 
safeguarding most U. S. nuclear transactions. This action 
increased the prestige of the IAEA.2S 
In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco designated IAEA 
safeguards to be the cor:Jerstone of its nonproliferation 
efforts. Si:uilarly, the NPT gave the IAEA a major 
safeguards role in 1970. This boosted the credibility of 
the IAEA. The full-scope safeguards establish by 
INFCIRC/153 became a requirement for the NPT in 1971. 26 
The non-proliferation mission of the IAEA was further 
enhanced in 1974 when a group of seven nuclear exporting 
nations established export controls. Nuclear Suppliers 
Guidelines (NSG) established by the Zangger Cormnittee in 1974 
and the London Club in 1975 complemented IAEA safeguards. 
The NSG maintains"trigger lists" of sensitive nuclear 
technologies that if exported would require the application 
of IAEA safeguards. Lewis Dunn states that "nuclear exports 
2STurrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards Experience," 
p.43. 
26 I bid, p.43. 
2. 
controls and supplier restraint have significantly 
complicated, slowed, or increased cost of efforts by 
problem countries to acquire nuclear weapons. ,,27 
In summary, =AEA inspectors regularly visit nearly 900 
facilities in over 50 countries. Their safeguards assure 
that nuclear materials have not been diverted for military 
purposes. It has a membership of 110 nations and has been 
conducting inspections for over 25 years. 28 
27Dunn , "Four Decades of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," in 
Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, Winter 1985, p.238. 
28Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes," eRS Report for 
Congress I p. B. 
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IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 
"Nuclear- development cannot be prevented, or 
significantly inhibited, in Argentina, 
Brazil, or ultimately all of Latin America. 
However, it can be encouraged to advance in a 
~:~~:ft;~~Rortive of regional peace and 
The fir-st nuclear concerns of Brazil began in the early 
1950s when Brazil asked an unresponsive United States to 
share nuclear technology with Brazil in retur-n for uranium 
exports. 30 In 1956, the Brazilian government established 
the National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and the 
institute of Atomic Energy (IPEN). These agencies believed 
that Brazil's economic growth r-equired nuclear power. The 
task assigned to CNEN and IPEN was to develop indigenous 
nuclear capabilities. However, the Br-azilian scientific 
infrastructure was not as advanced as in Argentina and 
Brazil lacked the close ties with the European scientific 
community enjoyed by Argentina. 31 Brazil did have a close 
relationship with the United States following their 
29 Redick, "Latin America and the Bomb" in Christian 
Science Monitor,(Volume 74, October 201982), Column 1, p.23. 
30Solingen, "Brazil: Technology, Countertrade, and Nuclear 
Exports," in Potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade and 
Nonproliferation, p.1l4. 
3100nnelly and Davis, "Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclear-
Proliferation," CRS Report for Congress, p.5. 
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cooper.-at:'ve efforts during World Har II. T~us, Brazil 
became one of the first recipients of u. S. nuclear 
assistance under the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" progra:u. 
T~e Brazilian military had nuclear researcr. prograI!'.s 
independent of CNEN. Brazil had an official nuclear program 
under the state-owned Brazilian Nuclear Corporation 
(Nuclebras) and "parallel" nuclear progra:us controlled by 
the Brazilian military. The "parallel U nuclear programs 
were also known collectively as the Autonomous Nuclear 
Technology Program (PATN) and they were run by the military-
controlled National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN). 
Within the PATN, the arazilian army, air force, and navy 
each had their own nuclear research program. Nuclear 
technology was, however, shared between Nuclebras and the 
parallel program. The parallel program was a major 
proliferation concern because of its secrecy and use of 
unsafeguarded facilities. 32 
Brazil built two nuclear research reactors and one 
power reactor with United States assistance under the "Atoms 
for Peace" program. The research reactors, IB:AR-l in Sao 
Paulo and TRIGA-UMG in Belo Horizonte, became operational in 
1957 and 1960 respectively. All nuclear exports from the 
United States under the "Atoms for Peace" program required 
32Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 243. 
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::he supervisior_ of the L;;:::;'.. Brazil acio?ted some of tje 
lessons lear:1ed from IAER-~ acci :'riga-:JMG ar_d :::lU~lt its 
f~rst ~:ldiger.ous research reacto::- (REIN-l in Rio "Je 
2aneiro). R:::IN-l started operat':'or.s ir. 1965. ?tis research 
reactor used medi'.l::l-enric:ted ura:li'.lffi s'.l?p~ieci by the T;r.~teci 
states. 33 Since the U.s. supplied the nuclear fuel, IAEA 
safegl.;.ards · ... ere req:l.;.~red at REIK-I. 
':he Westicghouse Corpora:.ion began t:1e constrl.;.ct~on of 
3ra"il's f~rst nuclear powe::- plan:. ~n 1971. This dea~ ''''ith 
a U.S. firm was a su::'ject of controversy because it d~ci not 
include any transfer of tectnology.34 This reactor used 
low-enr-iched uranium fuel. Under the terms of the cont:ract, 
Brazil would remain dependent on external sources of 
enricheci uraniurr, because the u.s. would not t::-ansfer any 
ur-anium enrichment technology. T:1is frus:.ratec Brazil's 
military governrr,ent and motivated it to seek nuclear 
technology f:rom nat':'ons other t:1an the United States. 
Brazil was slowly develop':ng an indigenous nuclear 
capability, but, the Brazilian military wanted faster 
progress. In 1974, Ar-gentina's Atucha I power- plant started 
operations and highlighted the gap between Argent':ne and 
33 I bid, p.262. 
34Donnelly and Davis, "Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclea:r 
Proliferat':on," p.5. 
33 
Brazilian nuclear programs. Many Brazilians worried tr.at 
Argentina was obtaining the capability of building nuclear 
Weapons. The Brazilian military Vias particularly distressed 
over the Argentine plutonium reprocessing plant at Ezeiza. 
The construction of Brazil's first nuclear power 
reactor was a slow process fraught with cost overruns and 
delays. The Angra I power plant began to operate in 1982, 
but did not begin fu~l commercial operations until 1987 
because of technical difficulties .35 The Brazilian 
disappointment over the progress of Angra I became part of a 
growing rift between Brazil and the United States during the 
late-1970s. The Carter administration's emphasis on human 
rights soured U.S. relations with the Brazilian military 
government. In 1977, Brazil broke its military assistance 
treaty with the U. s. mainly because of external pressures 
related to President Carter's human rights policies. 
Brazil negotiated with West Germany for access to 
nuclear technologies that the U.S. refused to transfer. 
Brazil wanted uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
technologies. In 1975, Nuc1ebras completed a mammoth 
nuclear transfer agreement with West Germany called the 
"Deal of the Century." It provided for the sale of eight 
35potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, p.112. 
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1, 300 mega'.,-at-:: :Llclea::- reacto::-s, a pilot-scale pLltonil.:.m 
-ceprocessing plact, and a cOJn:l'ercia~-scale ·.Haniu:n 
e:lrich:ni"nt fac':'lity.36 The 'dest German c;overr.me:l:: did r:ot 
:::ecl'.lire :·.:.ll-scope IAEA safegc.ards as a condit-'-o:l for the 
trans:er of se:1sitive r.-.lclear ::ecr.nology. This a~lo"",ed 
Brazi:' to sha:-e tech:lOlogy beb"eer. its "para~le:''' research 
prog:::a:ns and tr.e s::ate-owr:ed Nuclebras cor?orat':'o:1. 
The tecr.no:'ogy obtair:ed :-com 'dest Germa:ly allowec. tr.e 
indigenous :1uclear progralTs 0: the PAT)! to advance at a more 
rapid pace. Brazil began bc:.ilcing two secret -.lra:1':'uIT, 
enricr.r:-ent plar:ts in ':'983, one at tr.e Ara:nar Resea:::ch Center 
in Tpero and other at t!1e :PEN facil.:.ty '::':1 Sao Pac:.lo. 
1987, Brazil achieved a :najor breakthroug!1 in cent:-ifuge 
enricr.r:-.en:: tecr.nology at the IPEN facility at the U:liversi:.y 
of Sao Pau:'o. ':'!J.is breakthro-.lg!1 ensured Brazil access 
weapor:s-grade u::-ani'J:n d'Jring the 19905.37 
By :'ate :988, t!J.e :pe:-o enrichme:Jt plant r.ad 300 
operat'::'ng centr':fuges. The estimated capacity of this 
facility could produce enoug~'l weapons-grade uranium for two 
to three weapons annual:'y. Accord-'-:1g to a West GerIT.an 
36Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 243. 
37Spector "'~'le Undeclared BOITD, p.258. 
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ir.telliger.ce report, as ear:y as 1987, Brazil had the 
ability to produce highly-enriched urar.ium. 38 Brazil 
circumvented safeguards on West German techno:'ogies in order 
to use them in unsafeguarded parallel program. The West. 
German government protested to Brazil in 1987 that the 
Brazilian National Nuclear Commission (CNEN) was siphoning 
off technicians from the safeguarded West German-Brazi2.ian 
enrichment program, to work on the parallel program. 39 
In 1985, financial problems and construction delays forced 
Brazil to curtail the purchase of nuclear reactors from West 
Germany. Brazil canceled plans to build any new nuclear 
reactors beyond the two power plants under construction at 
the time (Angra II and Angra III). Table VI presents 
Brazil's nuclear facilities. 
3~ark Hibbs, "Germans say Brazil Developing Two Production 
Reactors," Nucleonics Week (27 July 1989), p.19. 
39Antonio Rubens Britto de Castro, Noberto Majlis, Luiz 
Pinguelli Rosa, and Fernando de Souza Barros, "Brazil's Nuclear 
Shakeup: Military Still in Control," The Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists (Volume 45, Number 4, May 1989), pp.22-25. 
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TABLE IV 
BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE 
One operational power reactor 
ANGRA I (Light-water, 626 MWe, us supplier) 
Two power reactors under construction 
ANGRA II (Light-water, 1300 MWe, German supplier) 
Completion goal 1994- idle since 1988 
ANGRA III (Light-water, 1300 MWe, German supplier) 
Completion goal 1999- foundation stage 
Four research reactors 
[One without IAEA safeguards] 
Four Uranium enrichment plants 
[Two without IAEA safeguards 1 
ARAMAR Research Center, Ipero 
IPEN, Sao Paulo 
("several dozen kilograms" of 20% enriched uranium 
per year) 
Two laboratory scale plutonium extraction plants 
[one with partial IAEA safeguards] 
IPEIf, Sao Paulo{S kg of plutonium per year) 
163, 276 metric tons of assured uranium reserves 
Source: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, 260-261. 
37 
In 1988, Nuclebras was dissolved and state utility, 
Electrobras, took control of all nuclear power plant 
operations. 4iJ The 1988 reorganization was directed by the 
Sarney administration(1985-1989) as a cost cutting meaSure 
and as a part of a privatization program. This 
reorganization required civilian control over nuclear 
research that had been dominated by the military. 
A new Brazilian Constitution was promulgated in 1988 
that allowed nuclear research for only peaceful purposes. 
The Brazilian military continued to operate many classified 
facilities even though the Constitution outlawed the use of 
nuclear technology for military purposes. A vivid example 
of the Brazilian military's secret efforts to build an 
atomic weapon was the discovery of a nuclear test site built 
in the Amazon. In September 1990, President Collor visited 
a 320-meter deep hole in Serra do Cachimbo built by Brazil's 
former military governments to test nuclear weapons. 
According to the Brazilian journal VEJA, this US$l million 
dollar hole proved both the bellicose intentions of the 
military government and its irresponsible spending habits. 41 
4Opotter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, p.112. 
41"Militares: Acao tapa-buraco [Military: Operation fill the 
Holes}," (in Portuguese), VEJA, 26 september 1990, translated and 
reported by~, (9 November 1990). 
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President Collor sym.oo':'ica':'ly sealed the sha::t ar.d ;):::-o:nisec. 
to e:lc. all sec:::-et nt;.clea:::- researc:"1 by tr.e IT.:::'litary. 
Ever: afte::- :.r.ese positive steps ,;,Ie:::-e tar::e:l by the 
Collor ad:-1ini3tration, :.he n'Jclear facili::ies ar:d the 
in:rastn:cture of tr.e nuclear p:::-ogram, 3::-'--11 rerr,ai:-; intact 
in Brazil. Ir:te:::-:la:::::'onal r.o:lprol:::'fe::-a:.io:l reg':'mes ':ike t.1e 
inf::-astrJC:'"Jre in Brazi': are -'--:1sufficient ':':1 order to 
gua:::-antee :.heir good wi':l. 
Table V provides a sum:nary of the reasons why Z\.:::-gentina 
or Brazil r.ave been suspected by t:,e international cOll'_"l1t.:.nity 
of trying :'0 build n"Jclear · .. ·eapons. 
TABLE V 
SUMMARY OF ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN PROGRESS TOWARDS BUILDING 
AN ATOMIC BOMB 
a. Ample uraniun resources 
b. Sophisticated scientific community 
(European connections) 
Large nuclear energy infrastructure 
(nuclear fuel cycle complete) 
d. Refusal to sign NPT nor comply with the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 
e. Clandestine and unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities 
f. Delivery systems for nuclear · ... eapons 
available(Conaor II in Argent':'na 
and Ol:"bita in Brazil) 
J9 
Argentina and Brazil have the nuclear expertise to build a 
nuclear weapon before the end of the century, The decision 
to build a nuclear weapon, however, requires substantial 
financial backing that neither economy could easily sup~ort. 
It would be difficult for the democratic 
governments in Argentina and Brazil to justify such an 
expense to their publics, 
In August 1991, the Brazilian public learned that US$65 
million in a secret fund was used for nuclear projects by 
the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE) ,42 This secret fund 
purchased centrifuge machinery at the Ipero enrichment 
plant,43 The existence of this fund raised doubt on the 
promises made by Collar in the Guadalajara Accord. It 
questioned Collar' s true intentions regarding nuclear 
weapons, and it showed the danger of military insubordinat-
ion in a fledgling democracy. If nuclear weapons are 
developed during the 1990s in either nation, it will likely 
be through defiant military programs. Therefore, the only 
way to ensure that these nations do not produce nuclear 
42"POCO sem fundo [Bottomless Pit]," (in Portuguese), ISTOE 
SENHOR, 14 August 1991, translated and reported in INFO-SOUTH (7 
September 1991). The Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE) is the 
Brazilian equivalent to the National Security Council in the 
Uni ted States, 
43"Uroa verba atoroica [An Atomic Fund]," (in Portuguese), 
VEJA, 14 August 1991, translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH (20 
September 1991). 
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weapons will be the establishment of civilian supremacy over-
the mi:'itary. 
~eonard Spector warns that "Arge!l.tina and Brazil are 
primed to cross the nuclear threshold if political winds 
should shift. ,,44 Full-scope IAEA safeguards are the best 
protection against !l.uclear proliferation "political winds" 
change. 
since the mid-1970's, Brazil's nuclear policy has bee!l. 
characterized by a drive toward the development of an 
independent export capability couple with ambivalence 
regarding the use of nuclear power for military purposes. 45 
Nuclear exports 'Nere seen as assuring Brazil of increased 
international prestige, as well as providing it with foreign 
exchange to help service the country's increaSingly 
burdensome foreign debt. The potential of nuclear weapon 
capabilities was interpreted as an instrument of influence 
in Brazil's foreign policy. Finally, technological 
autonomy- the freedom to research, to develop, and to 
exploit new and advanced alternatives in the industrial, 
44Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm 
After the Lull," in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 
p.37. 
45 Binkley and Gardner, "A Collar on Brazil's Bomb? article 
in Eye on Supply, a quarterly review published by the Emerging 
Nuclear Suppliers Project at the Monterey Institute of Inter-
national Studies, (Number 2, Fall 1990), p.27, 
41 
mil-=--tar-y, and scier.:.'--fic fie~ds becar..e par:. of t:le ~ogica:' 
ap:?roach for :.he ce';elopme;]t of r.'Jclear- technology .'-:-:: 
Brazil. 
A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
A chronology 0: tr.e IT.os:, sigr.'--fica::t e'1ents i:1 the 
develo:?mer.t of tje n'Jclear program in Braz.'-l can be 
s'JmtTIarized as fol~O'."is: 
1957- T:le International Atomic 2:lergy Agency (I.'l.EAJ.'-s 
founded. The purpose 0: the agency is ->:'0 "acce:'erate 
and enlarge the con<:ributions of a<:omic energy to 
peace, :lea,:,th, and prosperity throughout <:he world." 
I->:. sha':'l ensure, so far as it is able that assistance 
provided ';:;y it or- at i<:s request, or under its 
super-vision or- contr-ol, is not used in such a ';;ay as 
to ::urther- mi':'itar-y purpose. The IAEA is a warn.'-ng 
system and not an enforcement mechanism. 
1967- Trea:'y of T~ate~olco is signed. Tr.e Treaty entered in 
ope:'ation in 1968. (Treaty for the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons in Latin America.) 
J,969- T::.-eaty of Tlatelolco supplemented by the establisr.ment 
of the OPANAL (Organization fo::.- the Proh'--bition 0:: 
Nuc:'ear weapons in Latin AlTIer-ica). 
- A b'--later-al agreement for scientific and <:echnical 
cooper-at ion is signed between Br-azil and Germany. 
197C-
1972- 31~a:cra~ ag::-eemert of T.lclea::: de'!e~op-c:',er_t 
19:4- ~.lc~ear Sc;?p~ie::-
, Ch'..na, tte "J.K, and Frd:Jce, 
Ind~a cetonates a;; atorric weapon for 'peaeeL:1 
. 975 - Agreemen: concerning :he peacelul l:se of r.uclea:-
e:lergy between B::-az'..l and Germany is siCJ'"led. 
~975- oraz'..l becomes the "'L::-st f:oun::ry '..n h:,c;tory to 
com?le::e ·'fuel cycle" needed io::- nuclear weapons 
develo::l:,:,.ent. GerIT,an-3:-az-'..l-'..a:l deal to construe':: 
eight -luclear pO',/e::- ?la:lts, a P1'_lton'..um reprocess-'..'"lg 




Ger:nany's KraEt',,'erk Union. Sale of tr:e last two 
facilities is controversial, since either could be 
used to pcoduce materials :1eeded for a nuclear bomb. 
Thece are repocts that the Arge:1tineans had re~.oved 
SOkg of Plutonium waste from its .r.tucha atomic station 
(';loter.tiaily enough for '5 atomic bombs) . 
1976 - Safeguards Ag:::eements signed, by both Argentina and 
Brazil, '",i t h the IAEA. 
:979- Brazi ~ begins its "parallel" nuclear pcogra8, which is 
under military control and, unlike the civilian 
program, is not subject t.o international safegua::-ds. 
1980 - In April, Argentina and Brazil sign ar. agree:uent for 
tte peace ful uses of nuclear energy. This was the 
beginning of a fn:itful relatior.ship. 
1:1 May, both natio:1s signed another agreement to help 
in the construction of an Argen t ir.e (German sl.;';lp l ied) 
power reactor . Brazil · ... ill supply urar,ium and 
zircal l oy tubes, and the Brazilia:1 company NUCLEP wil l 
construct the core vessel and other r.eavy components 
for Argentina's third(Germa:1 supplied) reactor . 4f 
47 John R. Redick, "Argentina and Brazil: An Evolving Nuclear 
Relationship " , Occasional Paper Seven, published by the Cent re 
for the Interr,ationa l Po l icy Studies, University of Southampton, 




Presidp:l 0: 3razi and 
-:::r.e nat ior;o, 501e~ .. 
'ember 1RR::» 
tLat B:tazi~ ::"i:t ?o:-ce is 
bu':'lc':'ng a 
Sar:ley cen :es t:-le al' egat ior:, 
is to .::Je used 1936. 
- The NaL.ur.al N'..:.cleac 2::-Iergy COllUT,is:3ion(CNt:N) ':'s p~aced 
t.:.ncer ::.he direction -:::he National Secc.rit.y Council. 
qiv:'r.g its prog:-a;n~ a :n.:._.:.t.ary character. (October 
1987- '::-~e Braz'_1ia:l ?ress :-e\"ea~s ':.hat. 3cazil's "pat'a:':'e1 
I:csa£egudcded r.uclear r:-og:-ilITl ':'5 be':'ng iU:lded by 




c ser:sit~' e capaL~l,-ty cO.l~d 
a ke;/ eler:-,er.t :or the mal".'Jtac::'l,re of 
comb. Septe:cbe:::- 198,: J 
:988- -:::'he .If.sa:egca:cded ,":lr_c~mE':lt plar:~. at. =pero ~,3 
o:::':'c':'a111' oper.ed. (tl.pr':'l _988;, 
commic:ment of :leac.s of state (Collor de ~lello and 
Ccrios ~ler.em) to rencunce all nuclear test':'r.g 
e:Clbrace a b~la':eral insFectior" reg:"me anc ful:" scope 
of IAEA saleguards. Ttey a:"sc comm:"tt.ed bot~ nat.':'on 
:0 e'ient'_al full-adherence ':-0 t.he T':'atelolco ':rea':1" 
In Septenber, President Collar de :-1e:"lo announces tr.e 
closure of n facility long suspected of being a 
TI'.lClear weapons t.est site. Civ:"lian replaced r:,ilit.ary 
o~ficers at t:le natio:l's Cer.ter for Nuclea:::- Policy. 
In Octo::,er, Brazi:" ac.",now:"edges a 1S-year old 
program to bu:"lc a nLclear bomb and anr:ounces 
::ermir.ation. 
l'hese even::.s were key factors ir. the creation of t~E' 
'::-oint System of Accountir.g ar.d Control of Nuclea:-
46 
-=--:l:op""ctions und earry 0~t othe~- ;Jroe'--'d~res fo: 
dPpl~C'a:...iol1 -::-.r.e Systemlseee', 
- n~l 18/ ?res':'del1~s Co La:: de ~le:~o and Car':'os 
~lene:':',(A::gentir.a) 'O.:gr. t:le deeord for tole Exc 
Peace;'!.:::' :_L:e Energy. 40 
COC>DE.cotioc De'!e lop:~er.ts" 
1992, 
" 
~993- Bra:i liar. go\'e:-:1rr.e:r:: 
l. r. t:" ~ 9 94 . 
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V. DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
ly 
seCl:c'.. ty. 
3ra;c'..~ia[: lIl':'litarl' acc 
~l:e sl_a~e's ad':!i:l s~rative LUretLlCracy."" 
essent al fo::: of tr.e :1at 
rela:.ed to t:le nl:c::'ear power 
pr'..or'..ty '.·ias g':'ver. integ:::ated body 
0:: ~ho-lgh~ cO:lcecned w'..th state p::'a:-;n'..:1g a~ld ar:d 
de\lelop:·ter.L I~ .. is clear the ::"!portact :::o::'e the SSG 
incorpora::.'..ng to;>-::'evel ar.d 
4"~ore:..ra ;::.lve8, ~'.~acd OpDO i~:o:1 ::1 l{.'.._ita:::y Brazil, 
p.13. 
.9 
The ESG has ir:fl'Jencec :.he i:1 o:1:er m'..1ita:-y 
sctools .'-:) Braz-'-l. .:\.l:red S-;::epa:1 r.ot.es tte spreac. of tr.e 
(joctr':':1e pa.:.'":icuiar~y :'0 t':ie Escola (amanc.o do :;::e;:.ae.o 
l':a~o.:.'" e.o :O:xe.:.'"ci:.o(EC:;::YIE) I :.I:e :op-level train':'r.g scl".ool fa.:.'" 
tLe m.:.L.ta::-y :liC;r. cOlllr.'.and. S:.epan traces t:1e 1011u-,'ing 
de'.'elo?men:.s: .'-:1 1956 the ECME cG.rr.'-cuLll:", made no rr~e:1:' or: of 
confere:lces on cour.terir.surge:lcy 01:" '..[1'.e1:":1a1 security 
st::-ategiesi by 1961 coc.rses 0;1 natior.al C'ecurity ;lad Decome 
more prevalercti by 1968 the EC£::-1E CU1:"riCl:1·.Fl iEciuded 
class hours devoted exc':'c.siveli' to t':le disCL.:ssion 0: 
i:1te1:"Ilcd secc;rity doC"cri:le 3!ld a!1o,_her :29 ciese; ~.OJ.:.'"S 
devoted too t_~e a:lalysis of r.onc1assical :orms of warfare. 
Only 2: hou.:.'"s ·",e1:"e devoted to t-caditio:1al IT,;.litary topics 
00 Ibid, p.14. 
51 :bid, p.14. 
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such as territorial defense against external aggression. 52 
This becomes highly significant in that, to be promoted to 
general or to hold any command post as an officer in Brazil, 
one must be a graduate of the EC3ME as elaborated in the 
Manual basieo, the school's doctrine has evolved from a 
partial definition of internal and external security to a 
more global vision of national security integrated with 
economic development. By controlling various organizations 
the ESG played the role of think tank for the Doctrine of 
National Security and Development. 
A. BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE DOCTRINE 
The doctrine of National Security and Development 
begins with a theory of war. The teachings of the ESG 
envisage different kinds of war: total, limited and 
localized, subversive or revolutionary, and indirect of 
psychological. S3 
Maria Moreira Alves writes that: 
"national security planning, and particularly 
efficient intelligence gathering on the activities 
of all sectors of political and civil society, is 
therefore crucial to the proper defense of the 
nation itself, for, according to ESG theory, 
international Conununist forces orchestrate and 
carefully plan propaganda campaigns and other forms 
of ideological manipulation, which are then secretly 
52 Ibid, p.14. 
S3 Moreira Alves, State and opposition in Military Brazil, 
p.1S. 
51 
implemented in the target nation so as to win over 
sectors of the popu:'ation and ''''eaken the 
government's ability to react. ,,54 
Such a doctrine clearly imposed a substantial threat to 
<:he protect':'on of :,uman rights and allow for concealed 
programs to be developed under the banner of national 
security "requirements". 
Developing a new strategy in t;,e face of permanent co:'d 
war led to what Golbery do Coto e Silva-the most influential 
Brazilian theorist-already at that time was calling the 
"Grand Strategy": 
"We have, in the highest levels of national security, 
a strategy-which has been called by many the Grand 
Strategy or the General Strategy. It is an art that 
comes under the exclusive competence of the government 
and that must coordinate, within a basic strategic 
concept, all of the political, economic, psychosocial, 
and military activities that may lead to the achievement 
of the objectives that embody the national aspiration 
toward unity, security, and growing prosperity. To this 
strategy are, thus, subordinated other strategies, 
whether they be military strategy, or political, 
economic, or psychosocial strategies ..•. The Grand 
~~~~~:fro~~ i!k~s t~~d~e~~~hl~f a~~r t;~:i. grovides its 
Golbery held that a government must be organized around 
effective implementation of the grand strategy. The state 
must have full power to organize the infrastructure 
54 Ibid, p.16. 
55More ira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 
p. 20. 
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necessary for national security, and parc':"c'Jlarly to 
guarantee .u:te::,nal security. He developed a theoret':'cal 
model of t:le governmenta';' structures that ideally s~10uld 
perform ::his task by dr-aw':'ng the cor.nections bet· .... een the 
var':'ous state organizations er.tr.lsted with car::ying out the 
c::ucial "?olicy of Katio:1al Security" (Fig~re 1). 
Strategy or Policy if National Security 
Concept of Natronal Security 
Governmental, Directives 
j I I 
Political EconomiC Psychological Military 
Strategy 'f---" Strategy"--.Strategy ,,-----toStrategy 
Source: Ger.eral Gol~er-y do Couto e Silva. Con juntura 
Politica Nacional 0 Poder Execut':'vo e Geopolitica do Brazil 
(Rio de Jar.eiro: Jose Olympia Ed. , 1981), p. 26. 
Figure 1. Golhery's Theoretical Model for the Political 
Structure and Organization of the National Security Doctrine 
B. BRAZIL'S ROLE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The second important element of the Doctrine of 
National security and Development is the way in which it 
sees Brazil's particular place in the arena of world 
superpower cor.frontation. The most influent':'al of the 
53 
geopolitical studies that explore this question has been 
General Golbery's Conjunturo. politico. no.ciono.l.?£ 
According to Golbery, geographical conditions 
deter:':'.i:1e, ir. large part, a nation's destiny. The power of 
the nation and its ability to achieve full economic 
development depend on its resource endowment, and eve:J 
political and strategic alliances among nations are related 
to and partially determined by geographical position. In a 
climate of total and permanent war, there is no room for 
neutrality. 
Golbery, although accepting the necessity of 
subordination to the U.S., nonetheless claims the bargaining 
position of a privileged ally. Golbery states that: 
"When we see that the United States negotiates, 
using the weight of dollars, immense amounts of aid 
in order to gain the support and cooperation of 
undecided people or even frankly hostile nations of 
the Western European region in the Middle East, or 
in Asia- it seems to us to be only just that we 
should also learn to bargain at high prices and to 
use the fact that we, as a nation, hold the trump 
card. We should use this to obtain the necessary 
means to develop our land .•. and to carry aut our 
mission. We may also invoke a "manifest destiny" 
theory, especially since it does not collide 
directly with that of our bigger and more powerful 
brother in the North. ,,57 
561bid, p.23. 
s7do Couto e Silva, Conjuntura politica nacional, pp.95-138. 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE DOCTRINE 
:'he ::hird ~IIlport.ant eieIT,e;l~ of the :Jor -:::ri r.e of Natio'.a 1 
Secc:rity a:ld Deve::'opment ':'s ecor.olT.ic develcpme~t 
componen~.'5 First, there ca:1 ue ,.0 natior.a~ sec..lr~Ly 
withouL a high degree of cevelopmc:,:; . 
security I-equires ~te deve::'opE-,e;l~ of productive 
':'r:,-::usLrializa-:::~on and effective ut~ 1 izatio;) of 
:::-eSOLlrces, extel~sive cud 
;~ore.:'xa Alves, Sta~d op2os~tion in 11ili:;arv 3raz':'::', 
p. 25. 
a sf. ~ ~abor force V-,-=--tll ~ecj:!ical TILlS, 
:::r.e ractors ir. a r.at".io:! s sect.:rity a::-e 
-=--ts capac-=--ty lor 
·:;:t.:ali::y Gf its labor force, :::he de'le:'oprne:1t r,"= 
:::ec:l:101ogy, ar.c:i ::r.e efficacy oi i:::5 5ec::o~ 5. 50 
lcd'Jst::- -=--a':' deve':'opme:lt ':'s :':ldi5peI:sa.:lle t.o 
;=lohey. 
ar.d :1at:'o:la':' eie:e:;se 
::he CO:l::ex:: 0-:' 'tJester:l c.e:'e:lc;e st.rategy, eco:-,om':"c a:ld 
':'nfras:::rt.:ctl.ra':' de',e':'0p:Te:l:' -=--n 3raz-=--1 arp. esse:l:::ia:' ::.c 
cour.t::-y's vast. ernpt:!, spaces. Golber:y ::.er]~s :::."le 
a:lei ur.developed expanses "pa::hs 0: per.et"Ja:::ion,·· 
be effec:.ivelj" "plugged" 
~t is essentia':' t.o keep iL miLd that, uLder: ::.he 
Doct.r:ir_e of Kational Security and Development, rr.i:"ita:::y 
de:ense rather ::han tr.e population's basic ma::eria:" needs 
understood as t.he primary objective of eeoLon:i.e deve:"oprrer.t. 
Development 0: the vas::: expanses of Braz':'l's interior a:".d 
the A:"nazon, for example, is des-=--rab':'e main:"y as a :nea:lS of 
plt.:c;g':'ng JP possib:"e pa~_r_s of per.etratio", not as a way of 
raising the standard of l~ving in t:1e ar-ea. '!:his Las jeen 
59Ma r.ual basico da ESG, p 338. 
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pla ins bal'KS 0"' -:r.e g:::ea-: A:agc.c.'a and 
for 
regior .. (1' 
i:--:.crea:oe its :l t:le globed 
tr.e popu_atlor. the 
to geopo:'itiea ~onsiderat.ions 
To :':1e~ease orod1..ct:'or:, a :ni~.i.tary-industr:'c~ comp:,ex 
is to ~e encouraged and ceveioped. B:-azi~iar. tr.eo:::eticia:ls 
st:'~l argc.e -:r.e :1eed for a stI·or.g sta-:e, ab:e to app:'y a 
variety of fisea: i::cer,-:ives, :ax icducemer.ts or pe:la:'ties 
to regulcte the model of economic developmect i:1 ar. a.lllOS':: 
corr.pletely ce;1':Crally p:'('l):ned ecor.omy. 
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mocel ~s a :nodel of 
al1-=--a:v:::e alCO::l<; state, 
ar:d ~oca~ catJi::al. ~.'le ::S::: 1:extboo<; expl:"ci ~ly co~,sice:::-s 
1a-:::-ge pos:":-.:"?e ir. tr.e developme:lt of a 
sp:"t.e of 1:he fact: l.'-- ~a':{ ger.ecil,:e cO:lsiderab1e :":1:.err:ill 
0PPOS:"L-=--0:1. 61 Secc;r:"cy, as a:1 element ir: 
seCl.:.ri,--y" lmp~ies tr.e r.eed t:o cor.t:::ol t:le 
so as to p:::ovlde a:l 
a:.Lrac:..i·-,e c':":"ma~e 
peace is also :1ecessa-:::-y fo:::- ::he aC.'lieVeme:lt~ of 
of capi t_al accc;mJ.lation order ::hat :::ap:"d ecor.omic 
reac:les a "1:il"eoff" stage of developmer:L. l'lt:"ma1:e~y, the 
econom:"c roodel :"s designed. :'0 aJ.gment Brazil's po:.er.t:"al as 
a '.'JO:-ld powec. For s·.lcr. p-:::-ir.ocdlal a:ld a'.' impor-tar.t goals, 
t:le ESG textbook e::1pl".asi2es, the sac::::"fice of s·J.ccessive 
T~e Doctrine of National Secc;::-:..ty and :Jeve1opme:lt, 
because of its econorric, technological, and geopolit:"cal 
concerr.s, W-=--t:l0Ut any doubts en:-.ar.ces t:-,8 ~ikelir.ood of 
f·.ltc;re :lc;clea.::- develop~er.t ':':1 3razi2.. ~f Lhe "old mi _itary 
~~~10rei:::a Alves, S':ate an~osit_ion n )li11t.a::-y B:::-az~l, 
p .. n. 
;2 Ibld, p.28. 
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VI. ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN RIVALRY: FROM COMPETITION TO 
COOPERATION 
A::,ge~::ica a~d 3razii 
is oldes:: 0: al~ La::~:1 .;:-er-~ca~l cO:lfl~cc.s. =:: car. :::e 
tr-aceli to :::le Tr'O'a-:.y of ':'orde5ii~as ~~l 1494 
d:''lidel ::r.e \~o=-ld ne::'Neer. t"e S?ar.~sr. a;1d Port-JgJese 
k:'ngdoms. 63 TLe eultur-a~ d~':::'erences oet·,,'eer. t:1e Span~sr. 
Argent:'na and Poc:_'Jgc:ese i<; B-razil "ave Deen a constar.t 
SOJ-rce 0::' tens:,o:l :'n La:.i:1 f,mer:'ea. R:'valry neV,,"een :3ra::'l 
ar.d .".::,ger.ti~la tas i::s roots _n co'--or.~al t~mes ar.d arose 
trade, bor-der and sphere of inflJ.e:lce disp-..:;tes. P. dRelered 
'",ar- De::',,-eec Arger.t:':la 3caz~1 has :"lever oceurreG. 
:fo'wever, ar-med coniro:"l:.atior.s arose O:l several occasions. 
T:le ::-rst ~ilita)"j clash occc:rred over ,::;r.e "3anda 
Or-'--er.tal' r-egion -'--:1 U:ruguay (:825-1828). La::er, 3cazil used 
armed ir.cJ::-sio:ls -'--:lt~ Ar-gentine ter-citocy in a:1 atteIT,p:: to 
br-ing down Ar-gentine dictator-, 3r-igadie::- Gen8cal ~uan Yla:1"lel 
de Rosas, in ::he eac:"y .850s. Arger.ti:la and i3raz:'l "'>I(O::'e 
a~1.ies i:1 a "mar::'iage of con".'er.ience" against ?ar-agu2y 
dc:ring the _865-1870 Nar of tr.e Triple Alliar,ce. :Jespi:.e 
being allies, v':'ole:,:. cO:1iro:1tations Detween '::he Argentir.e 
(New 
60 
A ser-ies of minor- confr-ontations over borders 
continued i:1to the twentieth centur-y. 64 
A large source of friction and competition between the 
two countries centers around their relatior. with the three 
so-called "buffer states" of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
Together, these three countries form the La plata River 
Basin System because they all contain tributaries which 
empty into the La Plata river. The La Plata Basin is an 
area of geopolitical competition because it contains iron 
and because of its energy reserves{coal, oil) and 
hydroelectric potential. 65 
The Argentine sense of superiority over Brazil is 
rooted in its cultural and intellectual traditions. 
Ar-gentine history is full with articulate intellectual 
espousing the virtues of modernization and technology. It 
has maintained close cultural ties with Europeans. Argentine 
literature praises the need for technology and material 
progress to achieve a destiny left by their European 
ancestors. In the mid-1SOOs, authors like Domingo Faustino 
Sarmiento and Jose Marmol were instrumental in directing 
Argentine development. Sarmiento wrote Civilization and 
64Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflicts in Latin America: 
Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York: Praeger, 1984), P .101. 
65Ke lly and Child, GeopolitiCS of the Southern Cone and 
Antartica, p.146. 
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Barbarism in ::'845 and Marmol ''''rote A:nalia in ::'855. M These 
':'n~luenti.al books are an example of the ':'mporta,_-::e of 
moderni.zati.on and progress in the Argentine tradition. 
Thus, Arge!'.tina believes itself to be the leader i.n Lati.r:. 
America because of its soc':'al, cultural and sc.i.entif.i.c 
achievements. 
In contrast to Argentina, Brazil's perception of Latin 
Arrerican leadership results from its massive size. Brazil's 
aspiration to regional leadership has been analyzed 
extensively.67 The Brazilian faith in national "greatness" 
on the Latin American continent can be compared with the 
United States belief in Manifest Destiny. Brazil, like the 
United States in the 19th century, believes it too will 
evolve into a world power. Brazil has expressed interest in 
negotiating a commercial outlet to the Pacific and has 
placed a high priority on using the vast commercial 
potential of the Amazon. 
Some Brazilian geopolitical writers claim that a coming 
age of a Pax Brasiliana will replace the declining Pax 
66E. Bradford Burns, Iatin America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1990), p.90. 
67Analysis of Brazilian desire for international status may 
be found in Riordan Roett, "Brazil and the United States," 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (volume 27, 
Number 1, 1985) pp.1-17 and Wayne Se1cher, Ed., Brazil in the 
International System: The Rise of a Middle Power (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1981). 
62 
Americana. Brazil believes itself to be the "Colossus of 
the South" that will fulfill its destiny by becoming the 
first world power to emerge from the southern hemisphere. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s has quieted the champions 
of Brazilian greatness. However, nationalism continues to 
be a powerful political force. Jack Child argues that 
"Brazil's path to greatness is seen as a distinct threat by 
most Argentines. 68 
Arthur Stein argues that rivalry and competition arise 
from geographical roots as well as for nationalistic 
interests. Therefore, competition arises between states 
that are positionally proximate. Competition is not global 
since states cannot compete with all others simultaneously 
and not all others are relevant or salient. States like 
Argentina and Brazil are proximate competitors, they compete 
locally, with one another because they are similarly 
situated, whether geographically, geopolitically, 
militarily, economically, technologically, or in some other 
way.69 
68Jac k Child, "The Status of South American Geopolitical 
Thinking," in G. Pope Atkins Ed., South America Into the 1990s: 
Evolving International Relatjonships In a New Era (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1990), p.62. 
69Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate Circumstance and 
Choice in International Relations, Ithaca, New York-London, 
Cornell University Press, 1990, p.193 . 
. , 
Brazi~ cooperated close~y with the United States f::,o~. 
World War II until the late 19705. The goal of Brazilian 
cooperation with the United States was to obtain essential 
foreign i:1Vestment and technology in order to build a first-
class econo::1Y. The pro-U.S. alignment of Brazil received 
the scorn of the other South American nations that were 
distancing themselves from the United States during the 
19605. Argentina thought it was threatened by a conspiracy 
of its neighbors. The Argentine military resented the U.S. 
cooperation with Brazil because its qualitative advantage 
over the Brazilian military slowly eroded. 
When Brazilian relations with the United States soured 
during the Carter administration, Brazil's relations with 
its Latin American neighbors improved. Brazil no longer 
appeared to be a u.S. proxy. Brazil began to emphasize 
South-South economic and political relations and improved 
its relations with Argentina. In 1979, General Figueiredo 
became the first Brazilian president to visit Buenos Aires 
in 45 years. 70 Jack Child notes that "the loosening of 
70Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Southern Cone 
Subsystem," in G. Pope Atkins Ed., South America Into The 1990s, 
p.94. 
.. 
~r_~1ar'..ly becac.se ot 
Malv'-:1as-re'. k~ar.ds 
espec'aLy cr. '.. le) side eI:l!lc:slasticdlly .:::":::-<;;ecLir.a 
:1eighDo::-s. -:::'he Arc;-ectiLe IT.:'_i:.a:::-y ':eared tha:. Brazil 
IT,ig:lt :.ake ddvar.tage of Lhe tc.rr,oil fo~ 
T.he Falk~ar.c.s tc a:.:ac:-: 
felt 8 1 [,rge:1lir.a the falklacds desire 
to bc.ild atomi c ',,'eapor .. 
ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR COMPETITION 
':':<e :Llclear aspec~ Lr.e ;:'.rge:l~':":le-3razilia:l riva~ry p03es 
disLurbir.g ques:::io:ls because bo:.h cO'.lr.:.ries a::-e "t.lreshold 
r.dtio:lS" capab~e of developir_g a :ll~c~ear weapor. Defore t.,le 
er.d or t:his decade. Nei:.her r.a:.10:1 r.as ':aced ar. ex:.err.al 
ttreat tt-,at Gig:lt arguably caL. :0::- :r.e developrrer.t_ of a 
71 C l'.ild, "The Sta:.us of SO.lt.l A.::>erican Geopolitical 
l':;i:lkiGg," p. 60. 
72 rn id, p. 62. 
nuclear deterrent.7~ The ':'nte::-est in acql:ir':':Jg n".lc:'ear 
techno:'ogy '",e;::'"e for reasor.s of na:.ional pride d:1d :'0 satisfy 
er.erg1' r.eeds. ;.. r:.lclear ar:ns race began because both viewed 
nuclear develop:ner.t to be an irr,portant factor ir. their 
er.d'.l::-ing co:npetitior. for regional preemir.ence. At a 
:-;,ini::u:n, neither CO'.l:'d afford to fall behine. :.he other in 
the de'lelop:ne:lt of r.uclear weapons. 
Arger.tina and Brazi:' are not members of :.he to;'PT. In 
~991, President Collar expressed Brazil's reasor.s for r.o:. 
becoming a member of the NPT as follows: 
"Brazi:' did not sigr. ::he NO:1-Proliferation 
Treaty beca".lse it creates difficulties :or 
access to :.ech:1010gy.. the N?T is a 
st::-aightjacket that woule hinder our access 
to :Jew fo::-ms of techr.ology that are 
funda~.en:.al to the prospe::-ity of Brazil. ,,74 
Col:'or's view on the NPT was not universa:'ly accepted 
in Brazil. Fo::-mer Brazilian Sena:.or Roberto Campos claimed 
Co:'lor's interpretat':'on of the NPT is wrong. Acco::-dir.g to 
Campos, when Brazil refused :'0 sign the NPT, it unleashed 
widespread suspicions about Brazilian acquisition of nc.clear 
tech:lOlogy. Ir.stead 0: reachir.g techno:'ogical au::o:lOmy by 
7300nnelly and Oav'..s, "Arge:1tina, Brazil, and Nuclear 
Proliferation," p. 2. 
74"Co:'lor Views the NPT," (in Spa:1ish), EXCELSIOR, July 16 
~991, t::-anslated and reported ir. Foreign B::-oadcast Information 
Service (FBIS-LA':'-91-148, 1 August 199~) pp.32-38. Argen:::'na has 
similar reasons for ::-efusing to sign the tlPT. 
" 
rejecting the NP~, 9razil embarked on a path of 
technological isolation (from the United States) .7S The 
present administration of Itamar Franco is looking for a 
middle ground. It seems that maintaining a "status quo" in 
nuclear issues while not joining the NPT is the present 
strategy. 
European countries like West Germany and France catered 
to the Argentine-Brazilian desire to obtain nuclear 
technology and refused to follow the technology transfer 
restrictions desired by the United States. The major 
Western European powers have competed in the highly 
lucrative trade of selling nuclear technology for "peaceful" 
purposes to Argentina and Brazil. There are restraints on 
the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful reasons 
but they are vague and uncertain. As a result, nuclear 
energy programs can be pursued that, while ostensibly for 
peaceful purposes, have at least partial military appeal. 76 
B. REDUCTION OF MILITARY TEIiSIOIiS 
75Roberto Campos, "Os orfaos da historia [The Orphans of 
History]," (in portuguese), ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 17 September 
1989, translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH (10 October 1990). 
76r1orris and Millan, Controlling Latin America Conflicts, 
p.120. 
.7 
The red-J.ct:"on of m:"litary tension began during the m:"d-
1980s. Ev:"dence of the decreased :nil:"tary tensions between 
Argenti:la and Brazil can be drawn from the four following 
developments. 
First, the Argent':'ne armed forces will reduce their 
troop strength by 30% by the year 2000. A plan submitted to 
President Menem by former Defense Minister Anton:"o Erman 
Gonzalez will cut the Argentine armed forces from the 
current level of 95,000 troops to approximately 65,000 
troops.77 The Brazilian armed forces will also undergo 
significant reductions from their current size of 320,000 
troops, but the percentages to be cut have not been 
announced. 78 Second, in August 1991, Argentine President 
Menem, Brazilian President Collor and Chilean President 
Patricio Aylwin signed a conunitment to ban chemical and 
biological weapons from their countries. 79 Third, the 
nuclear agreement signed with Brazil during the Guadalajara 
sununit in July 1991 includes confidence-building measures 
77" Armed Forces to Reduce, Sell Property," (in Spanish), 
MADRID EFE, 17 August 1991, translated and reported in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-160, 19 August 1991), 
p.15. 
78"Brazil:Hot Brass," The Economist (6 July 1991), p.42. 
79"Collor assina acordo com Menem sobre arma quimica, 
[Collor Signs Agreement with Menem about Chemical Weapons]," (in 
Portuguese), FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, 20 August 1991, translated and 
reported in INFO-SOUTH (13 September 1991). 
6. 
coopera::::O:l d:sp~ayed :c anTS con-.c-ol ar:j 
';'r:ter:lat':'C;La~ agreemeLtoi ot:er,c proof ttat ~r_e tistor':"cal 
r',-.ra_ry -::'I'.e 
receded is tte ir:creas~ng ':"ntcgr2t:or; 
t:leir 
appear to be era ir. ir:terLdticll-.o. 
cooperation in 
Tte red.lced tensiono; bet-,,'een ArgeCltina and 8:'o.z:'_ :nake 
'::te fOrl7,iH ion 0: SO'--ltr.err. Cone COllU10r. Ylarkct 
possible. ':::,e p::ir:c':"ple of :::-ee :narke-
replaced t.le s:.aLisc- econol7ic po1~cie5 ':::lat ran L,e Lati-' 
Arneri car: economies into bar:kr;.)ptcy d'.lrir:g '::te 1a,--8 1970s ar,q 
8Clyrorris ar:d Mi1~an, Con:.::-ol1':"ng Lat-if: Ame:::-icar: Cc'r_f~ictsr 
p. 117. 
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lo.""t decade' c: ::r.e FlHO:o 
t::-ade. 
·;[.der lte l-Jeccosr.:c corr.;'"'oc 
a yeac beG:"r.:1icq ir. 1990, 
ceaci::":lg zero tariffs by ·9'14. ?ceside:1~_ Co: 1 oc cc..lled 
'·jf>rCCSJc "the ,.tact,iLg POi:lt for t:le effects of 
eco[.o;:-ic recessio:l, of lect:lo1ogical i:ladeql:ac:"es, a:lj 0: 
social ':JackwardYJes:o 
!o!eccos'..!c wi ~ pcoviGe Ci steppir.g stO:le :.he 
~or:,p~etion of t;le E:ltf>rprise of the A:'Jericas :nitiati'/e 
(EA:) anno..!:1ced by Pres':'der.t B'..!sh in JU[.e 1990. 
promises to :ua:~f> a commO:1 eco:1omic market :com A':'aska tc 
A::-gent.iLa. 83 P::-esider.r.: Bush wa!l:.ed regional eco:lOmL: 
mal:":~ets established before in:.eqra:.ion with the 'J.5. :narket 
can be c0:'1p1etec. The preser.t adr.inis::ratior. 
70 
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SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND FUTURE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 
;:lca:ii DE:' a 
"8cia~ce.Eic~~,' 0: 
HO'N are tr.esE:' 
fl~ r:.l:er 
aspir-:ttio:lS ''''i __ r.ave ~o O'/erCOI1,e 
esser.':ia:':'y :1ega:'l'ie herita,~e ;:'eqc;ea:.r.ec ~:. by ~!le Sarr:ey 
arl::lir. i s:.ratiO:l t:if' po '..:.:'~al fiasco 0: tr.e :.:ollor 
ad:ni:1is:.rat'..O:l, Ir.::iltior. r:O:: ::l:l_;,' bact. 
fro,"" tl-.e 
t.;I:der permilr.e:1:: C0:1:.::-01, T!1e ~99~ yeat·'s to:.al :ca::ched 
:989'3 :,800 perce:lc., albei:. 0:11y 270 poir.ts c0:'1i:19 
u·.de~ Collar. Our:':lq t:v" last ;-oa::-': of :993 and Lr.e 
begir.nir.g of tr.€ pres€:lt yea:: fir:ance ;-:.i:1iste:: Fer:lanco 
:l:e:lrigue Cardoso has ~€ell fightictg a 33% mor.t:11y 
inflatio:"i. 84 ~:l Table VI :.r.e mO:lLr.::,V ::n:.e of ir.:lation is 
i"dica':ed tr.roughou':. the yea:- 1993. ihe acc~mu:"dted 
in':::'ation ril:.e for 1993 reached 2,567.5% co::\pared :.h'" 
pre','lOU8 recore. 0:: 1,78]% ir. ~989.o5 A~so urgently regL.red 




BRAZIL'S SOARING INFLATION-1993 






Cons\:me:- r.ec~no:'oc;y has found it.s Brazilian 
~o:nes wi t.l: a vengeance. While only I::' 6 percent 0: 
Br-a2Lia:l hO'Jseho:'ds had :-1.:nnir.g water in 1950, by 'd88, 
f1.:l:'y 7: percent were so eq1.::"pped. Only 26.1 percer,t of tr.e 
Brazilian r.omes ~ad re:rigerators in ~970, while b-; 1988 
proportion haC. grown grew '=-0 69 pe:-cer"t. By ~988, 
te':'evision sets COJld ile f01.:nd in 72 perce::lt 0: 3razi:'ia::l 
ho:neg , ar.ci a0.:.o:;-.obi':'e in near.:.y a :.hird of the 3razilian 
74 
~ 9 9 ~ ) ~9 1...r.e li:aited capac-'"-'--::t a:ld desir:e 
ac.eqcately ::0 t.lat :Jopclac::'or. grO' ... 'Lr.. 
0:: t_lis :la~::: :_earted respcr.se is :'lace espeC'ia~ly p~ai:l 
(See Table VII). l~'L~le tr.e re<;i:"l.e 1:0.0; 
a _",leI 0:" de?e~cp:uent :.oc Lle ~o\"er classes s-.l::f:'c:'e:l"t 
T:'ainly by 
Roett, Brazi_: ?olitico; in a ?atr:i:-o:1ial Scc'..etv, 
E. ~bic., p.2~6. 
TABLE VII 































uthe:- in::e::r.al e~emer.ts can be obstac:'es fa:: aCCl..;:::a::e 
:orecas::ir,g and analysis of tte B:::aziJ..ia:l economy. The 
ir,:'onral econOT:'y and its cor.stituents seriously understates 
their ir.come to r-esearchers r o:'::en to the exter::: of 
declaring no income at all even when this is in cleac· 
cor_t!"adict.ion to their livir,g cor:ditioClS. 
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A. ECONOMIC ROLLER COASTER 
hes requi:::ed hig:, :::a:::e 0: 
i:lvest:lent, a siqt:ificant stilre 0: 
abroad. :oreigr: 00::-t:olio inv8stme:1t-. t_hrough 
B::-a;::iliar. stock ma:-kets ilO still qc:ite r.ew and sr..all-bcale, 
1:1'. i s ir:volvec 
tJ.e latte:::- t2.ving come to overshadow grea:ly -:he "'or:-,e::--
al-.tough -'--:1 1988-1989 !:lillions of dol~drs 0: co:we::-sioJl of 
deb: i:l-o equity :legan to reve:::-se t:,i, decade t:::-e:lc. 
Wni:e direc:. i:wes:'lrer.t sets up a counte: flow 0: :inan( ':'al 




of :::>:of its 
ir. Bra:c:il, 
ger.era~ly bee! 
regan: are :ar :;:-om ;:-ccsc;. r:::":lg. 
from 
liar: n. ~9R7 ::0 $~ 54 year befn:::-e 
-:::n $2.3 1989. 
?or :..he::..r ceguire ;:lo::h i,.::e::e.st a:ld ei::he: 
':'ng over" in "'::~e 
to CDver oaymer.t" due 
a heavy ~oac: of service ce?~etes foreign 
req0. ires ;;",ass':":e trade 
imports. This ir. turn restricts internal cor.Sl~mp::i'_Jr. 
feeds inf:ationary preSS·.lre. Eventual:'y the ?roblerr 
on::"y ::escleduling payme:1t 0:1 the fo-::-eig:-l 
also renegotia::io[] of ~ts ter:ns and efforLs ::0 gai:l a 
significant degree of outrigJ.t ;:-elief fro;;", crecic::o;:-
and gove;:-nments- sometning very on the ager.da of 
Brazil's current admir.'..stratio:1. In fO'oct, 3['azi1 signed 
ag['eemen:: with private fore':'gn creci~ors on 29 NovembeL 
~993, ':'n ':'oLonto, Canada. In the Toro:1t.o agree:ne:l:: the 
foreigr. debt(about 93-95% of the total amounl.) was 
78 
negot_iated i n m'.lch l onger teems . 9" Acco rding::o the 
? resident of t he Braz Ll i an Cent:ral Bank Pedro Malan: 
By any meaningfu l s t: ilnc.ards of comparisOTl, Brazil with 
its debt of between $LS and $:20 bi ll ion is not real l y one 
of the region's most indebted countries. 93 True, t_he sheer 
bulk of its deb:: is rivaled OTl l y by th a t of ""exico, Dut it 
is at or be l ow c.he region's r.orms i :1 c.erms of relative 
perspective . Thus, in per capita terms, accumulated foreign 
debt is about $800 compared with roughly $1,350 for Mexico, 
$1,700 for Argentina., and over $2000 for Venezue l a. 
around 30 percent, the proportion of externa l debt to GDP is 
91 "Central Bank President In terviewed", (in ?ortuguese ) , 
Jo rnal do Brazi l , 5 December 1993 p . 15, translat:ed and report ed 
in FBIS(FB:;:S LAT-93 - 240 - A, 16 December :993), p.6. 
92 :;:biC:, pp.6-7. 
n Graham and Wilson. The political Economy of Brazil , 
p. 370. 
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quite 10""< fer a region in \<Ihich f er 5erne countr i es debt 
equals or e x ceeds GJ? Also comparatively good ·,.:l':hin the 
La':.in AiT',erican experience is t.he cebt t o export ea r ni:1gs 
ratio of JUS t over t~hree to one . 
h'hi l e in 1988 a comprehensive rescheduling of $63.6 
bil l ion, t.he b:.Jlk of Brazil ' s deb t to foreign private banks 
and ;.)ell over half ~ t s total external debt, ' .... a5 achieved, 
this arrangeme:1t quickly began to come apart at the searr,s, 
and in 1989 Brazi l f ell far behind on int erest payment s , 
wi t h the banks ·.lnint. e rested in further nego t~~ations with a 
la:ue-duck government . 'tl'ith 1988 exports at almos t $33.9 
bi l lion running higher t:1an predicted, permit t ing a trade 
surplus of over $ 19 bil l ion, B:-a2i l actually managed t o show 
a $4 billion balance o f payme nts in surplus after paying off 
t he preceding year's defici':. in this regard . This was 
accomplished despite in t erest paymen t s of $9 . 9 bi l lion and 
amo rtization o f half that much. (E xperts bel.i e ve that t lIe 
real va l ue of Brazi l ia :1 exports - frequently u nder invoiced-
runs bet '"leen 20 and 25 percent r.igher than the prices 
registered ' .... ith Cacex. ) In 1989 some $34 . 4 billion in 
recognized foreign sales combined with arc increase o f 
imports to $18 . 3 bil l ion to produce a trade surplus 0: $16 . 1 
billion . This dropped to $11 bi ll ion in 1990, to $9.9 
billion by 1992 a s imports needed for development were 
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of 
enVirOlll'er.t c: skepticis::, 2:1C vigi':'ar_cf' i:1 Brazi':'. \'Ii~_l:.l:l 
technological rrojects as 211 a':'terniitive to t.:1A 
long ter" developme::lt of t:le Brazi~ian 
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VIII. THE MILITARY INFLUENCE IN BRAZILIAN POLITICS 
c::'v::'liF.l: Ll~e, 
regard to ::l:e p:'ospec::s of c::'\'il':'a:l ciLprer"acy, ;:':-Ie 
per::'od f~o:-l 1964 to J985, ::]-.e ~:"litary ReF\:b~':'c, 
act_i\'e~y ::'w_'olved ':'[1 ::he pol':'tical proc<"ss in 8::-a"i1, ,he 
collec,.l\'C dec::'sion to 0'J8::-::11::-0',,", a c':'J':'_iar. reg::.:'e 
Letain po".ier -,,:as [l d::.fferer.t e~em8n, ':'n Lne IT.l' i::ary 
s::rd::egy ::0 restore ["'.lle and oreer,9, 
W.'lat cha::-ac::erized the M:'litary Rep(;b~':'c 
cec.ermir,at::'o:1 ::0 Lapid_y :lloder:1ize t:1e 3::-azi~ian ecoLomy 
wh:"le ignoring socia~ issues aLd ma:::-g':'nd:"::'zing the po~':'::':'cal 
:Jrocess. 'l'r.e :lli~':'tary transfer key decisio:1 areas ::0 a 
po',..;er 8_ite: -:::he 'CRcr.nocrats, Often foreign ::rained, and 
r:o~ma:"ly econom::'s:: tinct planllers, they operateci 
support of ::he m':'lita:::-y and ""i'_hout r<"gare. for e':'the::- ::he 
soc':'al or the po~::'tical consequences of "':.lw':'::- d<"c':'sions.'6 
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ON MILITARY REGIMES 
The histor':'cal conditions and processes wh':'c:'! prod·..;ced 
tje m':'l:"tary coriJo::-ate mys::ique are re~titi?ely clear:-. ~aL:"y 
~6 Ibid, p.l28. 
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in its his:.ory, t:Je sma~l country 0-: ?ort1.:.gal with its 
li:nited rr,a:'erial and [)erso:lne~ reSO'Jrces d':sco'lered the 
advan::ages at ut'--lizing m':litary structures -:or governing 
?urposes to compe:lsate fo:::" ir_adequacies in :::.~e a::-ea of civil 
organizat':on. This ::lOtion constitutes :.he :-:a:or fc.nct':o:lal 
pr':r.ciple of t!1e ar:"1ed nation ::radi::ion.97 Portc.guese 
ir.adeqJac':es in t:Je a::-es of ::-esources and civ':l organizatior. 
were even more in evidence ",hen that cou:ltry accepted the 
challenge of colo:lizing the territory knowr. as Brazil 
Becac.se a m':'litary sett:'r.g :?roved to be the one ir. '''hich the 
color.':sts were most amenable to a certain a:-:,O'J:lt of 
orgar.':zation and discip~ine, a rrystique relatec. esser.tial:'y 
to state bu':ldir.g begar: to form around Braz':lian land forces 
with far-reachir.g implicatior.s. As the Brazilian 
patrimonial state m':litar':zed civil society, it was mainly 
the paramilitary ordenanzas and militia that · ... ere emp:'oyed 
:or strengthening governme:lta~ institutions. The regular 
army was too small and ine:::fective to provide much ir.fluence 
in an i:1stitutional sense. 
The importance of historical precedents ane processes 
became apparent again irnrnediate:'y after Brazil gained its 
independe:lce. ':':'he emperor clashed with the civilian elite 
91Hayes, ,:,:,~e !,-rmed Nation: The Brazilian Corporate Mystique, 
p. 245. 
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o'/er the ::-olc 0: t :,e of 
e:~,peror t:le anr.y 
losl 
'--ts agra: '--ar_ 
c~'eatec. t.le r.at'--O;:1al 
a:ld rr '--"' t:'..a ar.d ':0 ;:l.l r_atior. t:-aditio::1 
fede:::-a i:;;:::ic cO:l::ext. Tr_e army reI":".alr,ed i:1 sma~' 
CO:lditior. it:;:; ir;sti-:::1,;.t':'o,.a~ stat'.:,s protecte(: 
b,' 1:1:e tiq'Jre 0:' Ra' iro Cas:"as, t:le pr-o\;ide:l::ia':' Clilitar~; 
dc:':",or.stratcd t.laL a :::aree: military man cO'.llc 
:".l::ill 7.:'e rrili::ary messiah t.radition. 98 
Bcca'jse the r.atio::1a':' g1,;.ard Lleoretically ::"llcd 
position 0: reserve ar:-1 to ::Je ::-equ':'ar- arrr,y, ::l:c 
ratJeI' logically stood as the only force capacle of as?ir;~,g 
,.0 fulfill the a::-:-ed :1at:'..on trati::ion 'w:'len tr.e natior;al 
qua:-d failed 7.0 do 30. :'je deve~opmer.t and expansion of 
ur:Jan forces ant cen::ralizing trends wil:lin na':ional 
government. all came toget~:er '_0 point :"0 a posi::ion of 
p:"votal importance for the army became obvious 
t:-,e founding of ':he repubi ie ::l 1889. 
In ':he a:::-ea of the political seier.t:ist o;':::'laF; 
Fe:..t :las offe:'ed sOl7e eo,;cepts regarding a:-mec bureau:::rats 
~8=bid, pp.247-248. 
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::r.at seelT to fit -i:e 3cazil~a'1 fa-,-~' _y 
dese:!: ijes d as prae:,o:-:.a:1 
tr.ere ~s a lack of -::er.tra_ 
pletr.ora of pe::i!=,:Jeral -'--:J~ti:'-ltio 
"po:"itics :oeem fo:"mll'ss, ":Jeca-lse tte 
to [,refer 
ir.te:!::leeir.e i:--:trigl:e ar1d ?oce 
o:-de:-.' Mor.;over, fa:: 
i:' a breakdow:l occurs, it ',;i1_ :Je ::hey 
:.hings aright." 
.;1,3 fo:- the illtel-ver::tiol1 solaiers in such d society I 
?eit sees L,em as re:'L-ctant to so "exceI--'t,perhapsr wlle::e 
.Leqitimated by history." f1oreove:-, 'The -:e::-y sha"e:'essr.ess 
of the polity, with its different instiv.n.ions isc:'atea 
each other a[:a at differe:lt ::'evels of developmen:., permits 
i'C being given a fictitious :on,. ~Lilitary ~'egimes cac do 
this :'or a t~me." Has :lot :.he 3raz~lian ITilitary cor-par-ate 
mystiq-le served 'Chis pu:-pose in varyir::g degl-ees for a :'or.g 
perioc of time? Have not 3razil~an milita::-y _eaaers a_ways 
-n Ibid, ?p.247-251. 
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flO ~ t b~' to sa'ie 
3r20' :;::om the odious mac:1icat,:o:ls of ~lnpa r':otic: 
poli::ic::acs: 
::her., ::he 2r::-y ~dS i:ervec! a£, 
a persister_t sign::i.c:ant ele::-ent ir. 
.iie, te:ldir.g to focJ.;s -:.Ipon :J.;:-;da:-ter.ta 1 ceed :0::-
·,:oJ.;lcl app2.y to t:1e prODlem of social .:ntegra-::':on altjo'Jg~ 
a Lesser dearee. Olivei:::-a ~/iar.:1a's assertior_ t~a:: 
society r.as al'_,'a:/s lacKed a :1a 
to t::le sit. cla::ior.,100 
seems apro;:,os 
rst ti'lle ir ::'..,.e:l-::Y O;le years) I a fe'A' irr,por-::ant measu.::-e:o 
';,-ere taKen ;)Y t:"1e governrr,er.:: tr.rust, ';,-::'tjout conse!1t of 
~iL_ta:::-y, as tje legalizat':O:l of indepe:ldel:t trade 
u:lion" and of t:'.he small CO;:'..'Tiunist Party, 2nd t.he reopening 
relat,:ol:s with Cuba. This partia::' re::',Q'Ia2. of 'A'hat 
Brazilians called the 'a,"'Cr_oritarian debr::'s' I was :ceinfo:::-ced 
Dy par-to, of ::he _9R8 Constitu~ion ',;hier. rfoplaeed the 
autr,or::'ta:-':an Constitution 0: 1967. The ne'", eonstitut:O:l 
establ i shed severe ::-estr ictioEs on state prerogati ve:s, 
ir_cluding drast~e LlT,itat':o[]s O[] Fol~ee de'Cent::'O:l powers, 
a:1d Fr-ovided firm gua:::-antees ::0 i"div':dLal rights ',;':-.P. tr.e 
l00 I bid, p.250. 
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introduction of the 'habeas corpus' and the 'r.abeas data'. 
Congress was given special powers to approve the 
declarations of state of defense or state of siege and to 
order their suspension. 101 
T~e constitution also redefined the way in which the 
military is c!1arged witI'. the maintenance of law and order. 
In the previous 1967 Constitution the military had been 
charged with the task of maintaining law and order and 
guaranteeing the normal functioning of the three 
constitutional powers. Also, the military had been placed 
under the supreme authority of the president, but only 
"within the limits of tr.e law" This clause, which, in 
turn, had been inherited from previous constitutions, made 
obedience to the president conditional on the military's 
assessment of what was or was not within the limits of the 
law. The new constitution eliminated this conditional 
clause, plainly subordinating the military to the president, 
and assigned the armed forces with the task of defending law 
and order, but only on the initiative of anyone of the 
constitutional powers (the executive, the legislative or the 
judiciary). However, this apparent improvement maintains 
the military's concern with internal law and order and does 
101 Aguero, The Military jn the Process of Politjcal 
Democratization in South America and Southern Europe: 
Outcomes and Initial Conditions, p.7, 
B7 
not reduce the autonomy of tr.e armed forces. Indeed, whi:e 
the mi.litary is placed under the authority of the president, 
other powers are allowed to request its intervention in 
domestic affairs, giving the military room to :Cobby and play 
these powers against each other, enhancing its own 
bargaining strength. 102 
The military functions, in practice, as a separate, 
::ourth power. It lobbied and pressured the constitution-
drafting congress with a specialized team of thirty 
officers, and succeeded in getting its way on several 
issues, such as the option for presidentialism rather than 
parliamentarism, the length of Sarney's presidential term, 
the limitations imposed on agrarian reform, and the 
maintenance of a domestic role for the armed forces. Also, 
the military rejected a law which would have rehabilitated 
army officers that had been dismissed during the 
dictatorship, and has refused, on grounds of 'military 
morale', to admit responsibility for previous human rights 
abuses, let alone to tolerate judicial investigation. The 
military develops its own research on the ideological 
inclinations of inland peasants and has autonomously taken 
102 I bid, p.S. 
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tr.e ~c ce:er.d 
~ r.eld tr.e~r- ir. 
tr.ree U: 'ice 
attemv= '~:le-=--::- cxt.ended ~lL-eSe:lCe ir. 
;:JU.::-eauc::-acy. ~'c::- -=-t sl.:-cceeded -=-r. L.::-ar.s:er-::-ir.g 
Nat ior.al 
sec.::-eta:iat" a~t:lougr. ~L was 
::'r.cluded -=--:-. the ~aw t:lat created tr.e r.e;.,' The 
[J.::-eser.ce of reti.::-ed i:l stale bl.:-reaucracy a:1d pub:"ic 
er,ter-[J:'::'ses :-e)'",a-=--ns ex:::-emely :Li.gh. 
Tr. B.::-az: L, unde: tr.e guise of legal [Jarty activities, 
electior.s, ar.d a fur,ctionir,g Cong:-ess, ::'t was t.:,e rn-=--l-=--ta::-y 
~hat .lad a grip on tree government, a]thO~lgr. the colleg-=-ill 
:olecr.a:li5I:'S of military inpu:: ',.;e:-e less ir.st: tutionalized 




"ir:ere o:!'~ c-=--al party :leld a ~ajor-'-ty d·.1€ to 
tr.e 
tr.e 
ar.d Lle Director 
Icformatio:l Syslem. ·':6 
t:-te:l, of t.r.e rest.::ts of t:le 964-'35 
experience, do Btaz' :ians t8 pe'pet'.1ate tt.e 
mi:':"tary ccrporate myst:'c;:t.:e by gra;ll._:v; :1:..lit<1ry leade:-s 
tr.eir re':'ati\'e j.1r':"dical tr.ey can 
3cazilia:l 
:la'le become 
period of ti:1e to iElerpreti!1g 
national c;i:::'.1ations In a ce:"Lal!1 -_<lay. In effect, 9ra2':"1.ia:1 
leaders seem to have become locked into a pattern 0: 
cyc~::.ca_ be~avior t~at _las :JeC:Olle tl:'ad':"tional. As Dolx:::ed 
O'.1t, t .is paL~e~'n llas been ;:lased t.:pon stereolypical t~:"nk:':lq 
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vested i:lterests. In this scer.ario, the military man, by 
implication, occupies the moral high ground so that, in any 
struggle involving claims to legitimacy, he holds the 
advantage. 
B. '1'HE RE'I'URN '1'0 CIVILIAN RULE 
The Argentine ar.d Brazilian militaries withdrew from 
control of the government during the 1980s in an effort to 
maintain the integrity of the armed forces. The institution 
of the armed forces is focused on the organizational, 
structural, and prestige needs of the military. 
~he performance of the military government affects the 
popular perceptions of the entire military. Mismanagement 
by the military government leads to a dramatic loss of 
prestige for the institution of the armed forces. 
Eventually, military leaders see the need to narrow the 
concerns of the military to the needs of the armed forces 
institution, not running the entire government. This leads 
to the military's eventual disengagement from politics. 
The economic problems confronting Argentina and Brazil 
motivated the military to disengage from politics and 
encouraged the return to civilian rule during the 1980s. 
The international debt crisis and the fiasco of the 
Falkland-Malvians war inspired the military to retreat from 
governing because the astronomical debt service payments 
" 
consuming the national budget. Simplistically stated, '::~e 
milita:cy desired to get "back to basics" by leaving 
government to civilians and concentrating on the individual 
needs of the arrr,ed forces. 
The Brazilian people traditionally admired t~e 
military, but the tales of corruption and incompetence 
tarnished the military's reputation. The Argentine military 
was disgraced by the defeat in the Malvinas-Falklands war. 
The institutional needs of the armed forces required the 
return of political power to civilians. The military would 
take a back seat to civilian presidents, but still held 
considerable influence from behind the scenes. 
The armed forces thought they could have the best of 
both worlds, leaving the government, but still retaining the 
prerogatives of power enjoyed while ruling the nation. Some 
of the prerogatives retained by the Argentine and Brazilian 
militaries were control over the military budget, regular 
pay raises, and an active duty membership in the civilian 
president's Cabinet. 
A problem for the military arose because the liberal-
ization increased the strength of political opposition 
movements in the early 1980s. Dr. Thomas Bruneau declared 
that "the initial opening stimulated the rebirth of civil 
.2 
society ... 107 The military could no longer control the 
liberalization process. ~iberalization strengthened 
opposition to the military government, and the pressures for 
the retc;::':l to democratic civilian rule increased beyond the 
expectations of the military government. 1~ 
The people of Argentina elected Raul Alfonsin as 
president in 1983 to replace the military gove!"nment of 
General Leopoldo Galtieri who was disgraced by the Falklands 
War. In 1985, Brazil elected a civilian president, Tancredo 
Neves, (with Jose Sarney as Vice President) marking the end 
to Brazilian military rule. 109 
The military in both nations still retained many 
prerogatives during the 1980s. But the reins of political 
power were no longer monopolized by the military. Alfred 
Stepan in Rethinking Military Politics, has an outstanding 
analysis of the changing military prerogatives in Argentina 
107Thomas Bruneau, "Brazil", in John Highley and Richard 
Gunther, Eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin 
America and Southern Europe. Austin, TX: Univ. of Texas 
Press 1991, p.9. 
108Jo hn Orme, "Dismounting the Tiger: Lessons from Four 
Liberalizations," Political Science Ouarterly (Volume 2, 
Sununer 1988), pp.245-265. 
109Jose Sarney assumed the Presidency because of the 
unexpected illness and death of Tancredo Neves in 1985. The 
military allowed Sarney to rise from vice president to 
president, even though rumors of a return to military rule 
were widespread. 
" 
and Brazil. Figure 2 provides an updated vers.£on of the 
chart used by Stepan to show the trends in declining 
prerogatives and increasing contesta<:.ion by <::he armed force 








































Updated Version of Stepan's Analysis'1a on Military 
Prerogatives in Argentina and Brazil 
The civi:'ian governments in both j;rgentina and Brazil 
have experienced increased contestation ':rom their 
11D Stepan, Alfred. Rethinking Military ?olitics Brazil 
and the Southern Cone, p. 12:,. 
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respective militaries since 1985, The high points 0:: 
conflict between the Argentine military and the government 
OCC'Jrred during the 1987 Easter week mutinies'" and the 
failed December- 1990 military COUp.112 The Argentine 
Military appears to be under firmer civilian control since 
this failed coup. The rising competition between the 
government and military in Brazil has involved the issues of 
low military pay and declining budgets. 113 The Brazilian 
military is feeling, once again, that under the new _ ~;lUblic 
their needs can be neglected in the same way it happened 
during the authoritarian regime. They expect increased 
military budgets, a significant modernization program, and 
their professional and technical concerns to be addressed 
and considered during the formulation of new legislation. 
In 1988, the newly elected President Collor de Mello 
had a series of serious confrontations with powerful 
generals soon after his inauguration. In his inaugural 
111 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p.122. 
112 "Fact Sheet: The President's Trip to Argentina," 
U.S Department of State Dispatch(10 December 1990), 326, 
and Christina Bonasegna, "Argentine Revolt reveals Lingering 
Army Tensions," The Christian Science Monitor(S December 
1990), p.l. 
W!i James Brook, "'Free Falling Salaries' Anger Brazil's 
Military," The New York Times(6 December 1990), p.A4. 
9. 
statement, Collar claimed t:o have "a silver bu:'let" capable 
of "killing inflation". Following the speech, retired 
general Newton Cruz insulted the President by saying that "a 
statesma:1 ',>lith only one bullet in his revolver shou:'d use it 
against his own head. ,,114 Even today, in 1994, President 
~tarr,ar Franco still battles with military pressure and the 
possible resurgence of military influence in Brazilian 
politics, The rumors of a possible coup, triggered by 
frustration and discontent with domestic policy and foreign 
affairs' decisions amidst increasing allegation of 
corruption, are a serious concern for the present 
administration. 115 
Financial constraints trouble the Brazilian military. 
Shortages of munitions, obsolete weaponry, rationed food, 
and low pay are now the main features of the Brazilian armed 
forces. 116 
114 "Collar Has Public Clash With Generals", Latin 
American Regional Reports: Brazil Report(RB-90-04,}May 
1990) I p. 6. 
11S"scale Of Corruption Scandal Provokes New Fears Of 
Military Intervention," Latin American Regional 
Reports:Brazil Report(RB-94 01, 13 January 1994), p.l. 
116"Military Frustrated With Lack Of Funds," Latin 
American Regional Reports:Brazil Report(RB-91-06, 11 July 
1991), pp.4-5. 
C. A MILITARY SOLUTION FOR BRAZIL? 
The defeat of the militar-y r-egimes in :'atin Amer-ica 
after decades of coups and counter-coups was gr-eatly 
achieved by conditions from the market place, and not only 
by the political establishment. This has resulted, in 
Argentina, in the humiliation of the ar-med for-ces by 
financial strangulation, and later, as a result of defeat in 
the South Atlantic conflict(Malvina-Falklands War). In 
Brazil, the military phenomena as an essential part of 
politics has weakened, but it is still present today. 
Evidence of this is offered in the current spate of coup 
rumors and reports in various Brazilian journals and 
newspaper-s published throughout the months of July and 
August of 1993. 117 Growing inflation has been invoked in the 
most recent rumors, reported by the' New York Times on 27 
July 1993. These were denied by the Navy Minister, Admiral 
117"Column Discusses Concerns About possible Coup", (in 
Portuguese), Jornal Do Brazil, 4 July 1993 p 2,translated 
and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information serviCe(FBIS-
LAT-93-133-A, 14 July 1993) I p.1; "Retired Military Debate 
Coup possibilities" ,(in Portuguese), ~(sao Paulo), 14 
July 1993 pp.28-29, tr-anslated and reported in FBIS(FBIS-
LAT-93-146, 2 August 1993) I p.39; "Possible Involvement of 
Sarney in Coup Attempt Viewed", (in Portuguese), FOLHA DE 
SAO PAULO, 3 August 1993 Section 1 p.5, translated and 
reported in FBIS(FBIS-LAT-93-150, 6 ,:~gust 1993), p.30 • 
• s 
Ivar. Serpa, But then, coups seldom come from '"ithin t:r.e 
governmer.t, but are plotted by those '",'anted to get in. 118 
Tte latest evidence is ir.dicating that something is 
happenir.g wittin the ranks of the dissidents a:1d the 
opposition sector in Brazil. The plans for a military coup 
bets on the failure of minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso's 
economic plan and fo:'lows with a campaign to smear President 
Itamar Franco's image. 119 According to the generals, the 
plan has a name for Itamar Franco's hypothetical replacement 
through an indirect election: Jose Sarney, a former 
preSident. An article in VEJA, on 14 July 1993 reads: 
"It seems that the veterans of the 1964 coup and AI 
(Institutional Act) No.5 have returned. They love 
talking about Peru's dictator, Alberto Fujimori. They 
venerate former president Castello Branco like a saint 
in a nativity scene." 
These veterans are not feared yet, but they are a nuisance. 
There has been meetings in which two groups of the 
opposition were consulted and discussed the latest situation 
in Brazil: the Bandeiras(recently formed) and better known 
as pajama-clad dinosaurs , and the Guararapes (established 3 
"overcoming the Failure Legacy" 
Latin American Regional Reports· Brazil Report, 
RB-93-07, 12 August 1993, p.7. 
"Column discusses concerns about possible Coup", 
(in Portuguese), Journal Do Brazil,"Coluna do Castello", Rio 
de Janeiro 4 July 1993, translated and reported in 
FBIS(FBIS-LAT-93-133-A, 14 July 1993), p.l. 
•• 
years ago} .12: '::'je Bandeiras are ir. favor of a "Fujirror:" 
so:c:.tion" to the 3::'azilia:l pro!:lle:ns. Tr.e Guararapes, on the 
ot!"'.e::, :la:ld , do not ',.;ant to central:"ze po·,,·e::, ir. one perso:l' s 
1.ar.d" For the::! the mi:itary regime wO"J~d be the best thi:lg. 
The suspic:"on that Sarney(Brazil':"ar. Democratic :v!ovement 
Party-Arnapa State}, a former presie.ent and current ser.ator, 
was invitee:. to participate in a coup d'etat is being 
examined by government deputies and other se:lators, Even if 
these facts are a product of -::"c::. ::ious pretensions or 
merely sigr.s of c.iscontent, the possibility of a military 
takeover oper.s tr.e door for military orier.ted actors ane 
leaeers to substantia~ly change the political equation ane. 
:'ook for new strategic so:utions, includi:lg t:le r.uclear 
option, to the domestic situation in 3razil. The mil:"ta::-y's 
poi:lt of view regardi:lg the nuc~ear weapons program has 
fo::'o'",ed guide:ines based or. principles of sovereignty and 
techr.ological autonomy. As former Navy minister Adm:"ra~ 
:v!aximiliar.o da Fonseca stated, duri::lg an interview in Rio de 
Ja;1eiro on July 1993, a-:ter being asked i-: the project was 
close to be successful: 
"I wO"Jld say that in tr.e -:inal phase, everything 
depended :l\ostly on a po:.itical decision. And on money, 
which there was also not enough of. How to prod"Jce an 
"Retired Military Debate Coup possibilities", (in 
portuguese), VE::-A Sao Paulo 14 July 1993, translated and 
reported in FB1S{FB:::S-LAT-93-145, 2 August 1993), p.39. 
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atomic bomb ~s ~o lor.ger a secret. As far back as the 
early 1980's, through ic.s autonomous program-what you 
called the parallel program-Brazil was mastering the 
technology for enriching uranium, thus joining the 
exclusive club of nations capable of transforming 
natural uranium into enriched uranium. ,,121 
This is the same minister of the Navy that made the 
statement that Brazil should drop an atomic bomb as a 
demonstration of power. 
D. A NEW MISSION FOR THE MILITARY? 
The decision taken by President Franco, at the end of 
1993, to built a fro:1tier surveillance system throughout 
Brazil's Amazon territory has a number of ostensible 
justifications: the war against drug trafficking and 
smuggling, the need to protect native peoples and natural 
resources, and the defense of national sovereignty. 
Following this decision new military ministers were 
appointed by promoting various Army generals. 122 
"Former Navy Minister Discusses Nuclear Bomb 
Production", (in portuguese), Interview in Rio de Janeiro 
July 1993, translated and reported in FBIS (FBIS-LAT-93-148-
A, 4 August 1993), p.l. 
122"Military Ministers Reaffirm Support for Democracy", 
in Portuguese, as transmitted by Rede G1obo Television Rio 
de Janeiro 2200 GMT 9 Dec 1993, translated and reported by 
FBIS(FBIS-LAT-93-235, 10 December 1993), p.2S. 
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It may also have something to do with internal presSl.::!:"e 
coming from the five military officers remaining in cabinet 
positions within the Franco's administration and their 
obsessive fear that, rightly or wrongly, outsiders have 
plans to intervene and develop some border areas. It seems 
that the Conselho de Detensa Nacional has won the argument 
that something needs to be done to protect a region that 
accounts for more than half of the national territory, 
including 11,000 km of frontier with seven countries. The 
military feel that control over the land, as stated by the 
Doctrine of National security and Development, is essential 
to assert Brazilian sovereignty. 
Franco's decision to build a high-tech surveillance and 
radar system known as SIVAK over the next eight years 
covering the entire Amazon region appears to be a political 
decision to maintain a stable civil-military relationship. 
The project overall implementation will cost between $600 
million and $800 million and take five to eight years to 
complete. 123 
Judging from their behavior, civilian leaders seem to 
apparently concluded that the advantages of the civilian-
123"Government Wants Amazon Countries to Join Security 
System" I (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brazil 21 October 1993 
p.13, translated and reported in FBIS(FBIS-LAT-93-210-A, p.2 
November 1993), p.10. 
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military arrangement outweigh the liabilities because they 
continue to reinforce it through their supportive actions. 
It seems that it meets a certain psychological need in that 
it allows the civilians to play the game of politics with a 
greater degree of abandon or lack of concern with principle 
or national interests than would be the case otherwise. 
That is to say, the civilians kno'" that, if they mess up, 
the military are there in the wings "ready to don the mantle 
of military messiah" and pull the acorns of national 
interest from the fire. Then, hopefully, after some 
adjustments here and there by naive military men, the 
civilians can return to the political gaming table and try 
their luck. 
If this is indeed the case, then the question which 
will remain at the center of national politics for the near 
future is whether civilian leaders will be able to grant the 
military the function of political guardians without having 
them assume the role of overlords; whether there can be 
rescue operations and surgical strikes by military leaders 
without them assuming hegemony and authoritarian powers. 
Eventually, however, military and civilian leaders may 
jointly recognize the liabilities of perpetuating the 
military mystique and the pattern of behavior associated 
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with ic: and choose to rewrite the traditional script of 
military intervention. 
The peaceful transition of power that followed the 
Col lor de Mello ::iasco tends to support the argument that 
the Brazilian civilian regime is here to stay. But even 
when the military has been relinquishing political control 
it has not, as David Fleischer noted in the "Pact of 
Elites," abandoned its self- defined core values. The 
broader problem facing the country is whether or not 
political institutions are sufficiently responsive and 
flexible to assimilate and respond to the societal demands 
that went unattended during the military regime or whether 
the political order established during the regime will 
survive largely intact and prosper in a democratic regime. 
The policy directions established during the military regime 
have changed sometimes modestly in the Nova Republica. 124 
Further struggles and political and economic mistakes are 
testing how elastic and tolerant the military can be. An 
apparent resurgence of a strong military influence, at the 
high level of the national security and foreign policy 
decision-making process in Brazil, could have a catalyst 
effect in the development of nuclear weapons in Brazil. As 
12~ Graham and Wilson, The political Economy of Brazil: 
Public Policies in an Era of Transition, p.281. 
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Brazil's Kavy :ninister stated in 1984, ',(r.e:J ::he m:'l:'tary, 
wh:'le denying pc.rsuit 0: ::he bomb, ',(as IT,a . .:;ir:g :::le case for 
keepicg nuc:"ear optio:Js open: 
Recent l"ilitary gains ':'n the poL_tical arel'.a of Braz:'l are 
stror.g :':ldicat:'o:1s 0: Lle immense :':l-::"uer.ce Llac. m:'l:"tary 
:"eader5 5,:':"11 IT,ain::air.. 'l'iit:l the suppor': 0: presiden:: Itamar 
Franco, wr.o c:lose to diminis_l the credibility of his M':"r.:'ster 
of ?inance and virtua:" ca:1didate -:0"( presicent of the 
repub:"ic, ::he mili::ary :lave guaranteed that their uni:orms 
will be safe :::rom the ef-:ects of an economic pac:"age t:'lat is 
going to c.ighten ':he be:"':s of ordi:lary Brazilians. Whereas 
the o::her ministries will have to work J.ard ::0 stic..:; to the 
$22 billion in cu::s promised by the presidenc., the Army, Navy, 
a:Jd Air Force will keep their t:'lree strategic projects: the 
125Mo l ander and Nicho' s, W:10 wil'.. Stop c.he Bomb? A 
Pre:"1ier on Nuclear Proliferation, p. 77. 
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nuclear~powered subrr,arine, the space program, and the :ta~iar.~ 
Brazilian A.."lX fighter plane. 126 
The yearning by the military to enter deeply, once again, 
into the field of politics seems to have grown stronger in 
response to the absolute political vacuum that accompanied 
the announcement of the Finance Minister's economic package. 
The officer class is now taking for granted that civi:ian 
and military personnel will be separated in the 
constitutional revision currently underway, thus making 
possible to approve separate pay increases. the military 
adviser to the Brazilian Congress, Commander Sergio Porto da 
Luz, says it is "practically guaranteed" that the military 
will receive a 186% pay increase. 127 This will represent 
another hard blow at Finance Minister Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso's policy of extreme austerity. 
With or without a clear mission, the military strongly 
influence the Brazilian political system. In the present 
situation of economic and political crises, various elements 
in the military sector had openly defied civilian rulers. 
Under these conditions, a military resurgence or an increased 
126"Recent Military Gains in political Arena Viewed," (in 
Portuguese), Sao Paulo .1.§1'.QE., translated and reported in 
Foreign Broadcast Information service(FBIS~LAT~94~OI2, 19 
January 1994), pp.46 48. 
127 Ibid,p.47. 
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;:"ole 0: L~.e miiitar-y ir, 
life ca:l be expected. 
[Joii-=-'-:::e.~ st:'c.ctc.r-e of Brazil-'-an 
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IX. INFLUENCE OF 'I'HE NON~PROLIFERA'I'ION REGIMES 
Leonard S. Spector wrote in 1992: "It is true that 
the prodiga:" proliferant states are returning to the non-
nuclear family- but how will we know if they have truly 
repented?" Over the past two years, four states with 
his'C.ories of nuclear weapons-related activities-Argentina, 
Brazil, North Korea, and South Africa- have take formal 
steps to renounce nuclear arms. But the past two years 
have also shown that even a country, such as Iraq, that 
has signed the NPT and accepted its safeguards can pursue 
nuclear weapons in secret, and, given enough time, 
possibly present the world with a deadly, destabilizing 
fait accompli. 
With the NPT subject to renewal in 1995, and 
expectations for slowing proliferation now so high, events 
involving the nuclear sector in developing countries will 
be critical for global non-proliferation efforts. 
Any state that hopes to produce nuclear weapons, 
secretly or not, must first overcome two technical 
challenges .128 First, and most difficult, it must 
manufacture or purchase enough weapons-grade uranium or 
128 Leonard S. Spector, "Repentant Nuclear Proliferants 
in Foreign Policy, Number 88, Fall 1992, pp.21-24. 
108 
plutonium to build the chain-reacting core used in nuclear 
explosives. Manufacturing either of those materials is an 
extremely difficult task, one that typically takes non-
industrialized countries 10 years or more to master, 
during which time they must build and operate a chain of 
complex nuclear facilities. Second, a would-be nuclear 
power must master the design of the nuclear device and 
then manufacture and test all of its non-nuclear 
components. A full-fledge nuclear detonation would not be 
needed, however to be confident of its capabilities and 
safety procedures it is reco!llll1ended. 
Would be nuclear powers are also constrained by the 
non-proliferation regime, whose cornerstone is the NPT. 
Under the 1968 treaty, countries without nuclear weapons 
pledge not to manufacture or receive them and agree to 
accept inspections of all their peaceful nuclear 
activities by the Vienna-based IAEA. 129 
For their part, the nuclear weapon states are 
permitted to keep their arsenals and are exempted from 
IAEA inspections, but they are bound to negotiate "in good 
fai th" toward nuclear disarmament. with the accession of 
China into the treaty in March 1992, and that of France in 
129 Leonard S. Spector, "Proliferation :The Silent Spread" 
in Foreign Policy, Number 58, Spring 1985, p.55. 
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August, all five of the declared nuclear weapons 
countries-China, France, Great Britair., Russia, and the 
U.S.-ar:d 144 other states have joined the NPT. 
The ::lost important challenge for the non-
proliferation regime is to guarantee that the newly 
reformed states-Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, South 
Africa, and the Soviet successor states- place all 
relevant nuclear materials under international monitoring. 
That must be done with great care, or those countries 
could retain a cache of material and resume covert nuclear 
weapons efforts. The task is likely to be enormously 
difficult because each of the countries has pursued a 
range of nuclear activities and clandestinely acquired a 
range of nuclear equipment and material. But if the 
difficult cannot be overcome, and if a country breaks out 
of NPT safeguards, then the regime itself could break 
down, raising the prospects of new nuclear arm races 
around the world. 130 These fears can be added to political 
concerns generated by the recent events in North Korea. 
The North Koreans abandoned the NPT regime's guidelines 
for a period of time only to recently agree to return 
within regime's standards. It appears that their 
i~D Leonard S. Spector," Repentant Nuclear Proliferants" 
in Foreign Policy, Number 88, Fall 1992, p.24. 
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A. NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND THE GUADALAJARA 
s-'-gned and agreemen, G~ada~ajara , 
~I,p~e[;lentir_g '.le 199:) :-10 19'.:.a2l~ =:>ccl.arat iO:l 
esta;-,l-'-sting :'.le Syste:'l 'or Accol:nting and 
0::: !:,,;c 1 ear ~,la:.er.:..a:"s (seee; a:lG t.:le I3raGi~-'-an· Argen:'~:le 
!"gency :or and Control ~f Nl:ciear ~:ater2.als 
\ABACC). A3Jl.CC -'-S COIllpOSec. of a of £0'-1:::-
me::bers a.ld a Secretar-'-a: 
:aneiro. 
The pr inc-'-?al 0: A3ACC .,,-,-.'-1 be :0 
adrriniste:- the SCCC, estab:ished :hc :wo nations foc 
:.he p(:rpose of verifying :.hat their nl:cl.ea:::- !Taterial are 
cot dive:-ted to lll:c:"ear ' . -eapons or [:u:1ear explosive 
devices. ABACC is ves:.ec witr_ :.he :-esponsibili:y 
c:or.d·~ct :be i:lspections and 0:'.1er proc:edl:res c;ti?l:~a'::ed 
for the application of <::je secI." {Artie:'" VIII, Paragrap~ 
B). ehe fO',lr me::1bers 0: ABAeC's Comrr,ission will :,repare a 
list of inspee<::ors f!'om those s(:ggested by the 
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qcwe-::-:l:-:ec:to, ar.d t.le Seccetar-idt '.~:".l select 
lcspec::ocs a:e ::0 carTY ot.::: t1:e icdi '-'--d\:a~ 
::r.e 5:: pl.lation :::1a:: eacr. ir.spect.lor. 
0:::- asses>-;mer:t of :1atio:lal r-ecords, a:e ::0 be 
reS-'o:ted by ::r.e Sec:::-e:ar-iat :::0 :::~e :'Ia'( 
t:ler. caL. t:,e of:e:ldi:lq pa:::-ty ::0 correc:: t~e 
seriot.:s :lor.<;ot."plia:lce by ei-:::r.er party er.ables 
t:le otter par-::y to aDrogac.e ::r.e agree:cent and to :lotify 
t:,e Sec:::-etary C,ener-al :Jr.':'::ec. Natio:ls a:lc. 0: 
O::qar.izat:"on of p_Clerican States (OAS), 131 C:eacly, 
A:::-ge:::tina a:lc. Brazil, i:l breakir.g new groc:nc.s to opel: 
:r.e:"r- ,.uc i ea-::- programs to O:le acot:ler ar.d ::0 accept 
compre:'e,.si'le :AEA safeguards to ':eriiy tl:e a::.-cangeme:lt, 
ace seeKir.g to derr,onstcate tl:at t.,ey s~ol..ld be acco:::-ded 
t:le same respect and recognition as otr.er states that ha·/e 
J:lde::::aken SOlemn non~pcolife-::-ation commitment. Tr.e 
Agreeme:lt. is an :"mpressive achieveme:lt b"t i:.:; t.:ltimate 
::.-equlres the following: 132 
132 Ibid. p. 6. 
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(1) ABACC ::,ust develop quickly to assume its 
responsibilities. This IT.eans that Argentina and Brazil 
must accord ABACC strong politica.L support, and provide it 
adequate resources. 
(2) The !AEA :r1ust, in the development of subsidiary 
arrangements, remain steadfast to the principle that all 
Argentine and Brazilian nuclear faci:i.ities are covered and 
subject to !AEA inspections. 
(3) The agreement shou:i.d be understood as an 
innovative Argentine-Brazilian initiative establishing an 
arrangement analogous to the EURATOM-IAEA agreement. 
(4) The Four-Party Agreement and the ABACC should 
receive the strong support, praise, and encouragement of 
the international community as it evolves. The success of 
the agreement is important, not only for the peace and 
security of Latin America, but as a model for other more 
troubled regionS(North-South Korea, India-Pakistan,etc.). 
(5) Attention should be given in the months ahead to 
the Tlatelolco Treaty, which Argentina and Brazil have 
pledged to permit to come into force for their territories 
upon conclusion of the Four-Party Agreement, and in the 
context of "updating and improving its text." The types 
of changes in Tlatelolco proposed by Argentina and Brazil, 
particularly regarding Article 16 on Special Inspections, 
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should be close:y mO:li:.ored. This "inspec:.:on ':ly dema:ld" 
a::-ticle has lor.g been considered a u:Jiq.!e and pote:l:.ially 
':'m?o:-tan:. ':eatt.:re of L'1e Tlatelolco Treaty. Tr.e impac:. of 
:.his a:ue:1dmer.:. is to remove OPAN!l.L from undertaking 
special ':'nspecti0:15, while clari:ying(somewhat) the IP-.E.;'s 
a·.1thority to cor:c.t.:ct s'Jch ::1spect:'ons. Whi:'e :.he 
ar.endments appea:- :'0 cor:fi::-ms the IA~".' s so:'e 
responsibi:'ity fo:- special inspect':'or:s, the lar.guage 
suggests :.hat st.:ch action can or.ly be triggered by a 
request to the IAEA of a :'latelo::'co pa::-ty and the 
conC".1rrence of O?ANA1" s CO·.1nc':'l. (It's ·.1nclear ,,-'hether, 
'Jnder t~1e amended a::-ticle, the IAEA would be interpreted 
as hav':'ng freedom to in.:.tiate such inspections on its own. 
Tt.'..s issue :'s moot for most Tlatelolco members wr.ich are 
also covered under :.he NPT, but of conceivable importance 
for nO:1-NPT natior_s:Argentina, Brazil, C:1ile ar.d Ct.:ba. )'33 
Tlatelolco may assume greater Significance with the rece:1t 
Cuban indication of willingness to adhere, 
following f".!ll entry-into-force action by Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile. 
'33 .::-ohn R. Redick, "Nuclear Confidence Bu':'lding in Lati:1 
America", University of Virginia 1993. A paper prepared for 
Verification Report 1993 Yearbook on Arrrs Control and 
Environmental Agreements, published by verification 
Technology ::-nfo::-mation Centre{VERTIC), London, United 
Kingdom, January 1993, p.2l. 
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(6) Finally the ABACC should be extremely careful not 
to give favorable treatment to any state in the Agreement. 
In addition, the IAEA as a mechanism of prevention, 
also encounters political and financial difficulties 
because of its dual mandate. The IAEA funded through the 
United Nations. The IAEA budget is divided between 
nuclear energy development programs and the maintenance of 
safe~guards. Hans Blix, like all the past IAEA Director 
General, faces political pressure from nations desiring 
IAEA help in developing their nuclear programs. Many 
nations want to see greater resources dedicated to 
building nuclear power plants, rather than being "wasted" 
in safeguards. The 1988 budget of the IAEA was $155 
million with about $63 million dedicated to the Department 
of safeguards. 134 Most of the safeguards budget is spent 
on safeguards in nations not considered to be a nuclear 
weapons proliferation threat. While some nations posing 
the greatest threat to nuclear proliferation are often not 
being inspected at all by the IAEA. 
A third are of weakness for IAEA safeguards results 
from the overlap in utility of nuclear facilities for both 
peaceful and military applications. The lAEA must 
schedule its inspections in advance, allowing any 
134 Ibid, p.42. 
115 
discrepancies to be hidden. For example, a gaseous 
diffusion enrichment facility( like the Pilcaniyeu plant in 
Argentir.a) can produce 20% enriched uranium for peaceful 
and military purposes. Increased enrichment levels can be 
accomp:"ished in the same faci2.ity through two methods 
called stretching and recycling. 13S It is difficult for 
the IAEA to monitor such a facility, especially when 
improper activities can be stopped before the regularly 
scheduled visits by the IAEA. The host nation can plan to 
produce only 20% enriched uranium during IAEA scheduled 
visits. 
The predictability of inspections is a major 
deficiency of the current IAEA safeguards. The advance 
warning of upcoming inspections allows time to correct any 
safeguards vio:"ations. Safeguards could be strengthened 
by random inspections. Nations with suspected nuclear 
weapons research facilities should be the ones having 
frequent inspections. 
But further evidence of significant non-proliferation 
gains by Argentina and Srazil were recorded in the early 
months of 1991 and 1992 including a disavowal of peaceful 
nuclear explosives (PNE's), progress toward strict 
135 For detailed information on stretching and recycling 
in Argentina and Brazil see Albright, "Somb potential for 
South America," pp.17-18. 
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domestic nuclear export controls, and restraint in 
development and export of missiles. The :oint position on 
PNE's is a dramatic reversal of a consistent position of 
both nations articulated since t~e 1960's. As regards 
nuclear export legislation, Argentina has already 
initiated important changes by presidential decree, wit~ 
further implementing legislation currently Defore the 
congress. Similar far reaching legislation has been 
introduced, and is currently pending before the Brazilian 
congress. If fully implemented, this domestic legislation 
would appear to make the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear 
export procedures commensurable with the Nuclear Supplier 
Group guidelines. 136 
The signi!icant gains toward a complete non-
proliferation status that occurred between 1990 and 1992 
under the civilian administration of Argentine President, 
Carlos Menem, and former president, Fernando Collar de 
Mello were a result of several factors: 
(1) The enormous economic challenges confronting 
Argentina and Brazil (including the immense debt burden) 
encouraged the leadership in both nations to look 
critically at wasteful, but historically sacrosanct, 
136 Ibid. Pages pp.1-3. 
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gover-nment progr-ams. In such a cli!l'ate, the civil nuclear 
program became a clear target for close scrutiny, and :.he 
econo~ic pena::'ties both nations would encounter by 
pursuing a nuclear weapons option, became more apparent. 
(2) The assumption of leadership by civilian 
presidents, the reassertion of congressional involvement 
in policy making, and the concurrent lessening of the 
influence of the military, were important factors in both 
nations. In Brazil this process has been gradual and is 
far from complete, but nonetheless represents a distinct 
break from the past. 
(3) Pressure from the nuclear supplier states, 
especially Germany, contributed significantly to Argentina 
and Brazil's nuclear forbearance. Germany's decision to 
require within five years all nations ,with which it has 
significant nuclear relationship to adopt full scope 
safeguards, was a pivotal factor in convincing Argentine 
and Brazilian policy makers to reverse 
course on nuclear pOlicy. 
(4) Mutual suspicion- or to put it more positively- a 
shared desire by Argentina and Brazil to build a climate 
of trust by making their respective nuclear programs 
transparent, contributed to the development of the 
bilateral inspection agreement. Less obvious is the 
H8 
'OlimiLi1ti'J:l 0: c-_l ffs aLd tie 0: 
:lcltior3 
~elped c:-ea::e bo::l: d ps: c:lO~ogi cal c':'iJ~ate 
cocpe:-atLJ:"l. 
impoc::an:: iac-c.or. S-c.I"ong leaders -'-n bo:.'"! :la::io:ls 
:,e~pec: o\'erCOITe bLrea-lcrG.tic iceolog-'-ca~ resis::ar.ce 
also imp'Jr-c.an:: to creatir_g an inter:lat onal 
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of -::.l:e Sc::e,;c:ards are, 
=f the hose ICatior.s c.esice l_O 
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i'.rchelac:s l'Jrre:F.::le, -:'or:--E'r i'.ss':'s-::.a:r:: Director a-::. the 
-AEJ'\ i :lc;pec 
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ar.c does 
secret :aci:"it.':'es. 37 It i:o c..'..ff c'Jlt 
for the :A8A to -:'oree a na-::.':'on to rC'ical c.eep':"y 
re~acc.inq the.'..r r.c.clear weapor.s research. 
137'::'-Jrre:1:.ine, "LeC':ooEs 0: :.he IAEA Sa:eguards," p.~O. 
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X. THE FUTURE OF BRAZ IL' S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
'T'he road <:0 regio:lal :legemony is perce~vec as 
diff'--Cl.:.I<: and de::ta:lc.ing bu:. Brazil-=--ans believe U'_at they 
have a spec'--a~ destir:y.138 Brazi~'s detert'ir:at'--on to 
nair.tair. an al1bi~uous impressio:l to keep oper_ Dotr. its 
nuclear pO':ler ar_d :luc~ear weapor.s options ir: spite of 
inc:::-eas-=--:l~ -=--r.tel:"nationa~ p:-eSSl:re is closely related to 
:.he underly-=--r.g poli:.ica~, na:.ior.al security, anc. economic 
motivar_-=--ons for kee~ing the ~rog:-ams alive (or at ~east 
p:::-oject'--:lg U'_e illc.sior. that the-'-r nc.clea:- option is sti~l 
a viaDle alternative). 
A ':'ist of the argur.-Lents in favor of nuclear 
<:echr.ology's developmer.t ir. Brazil <:hat .lave been 
meCltioned in the past ca:1 be used to explain t.le factors 
being cO:1sidered at the preser:t time. Table VIII 
summa:::-izes tr.e po<:ential costs of abandoCl-'-:1g tJ.e Nuclear 
weapons development in Braz-=--l. 
l~e David J. Myers,"B:-azi~: Reluc<:aClt :?ursuit_ of t:he 
Nuclear Option",in O:::-bis No. 27, Winter 1984, p.881. 
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TABLE VIII 
POTENTIAL COST OF ABANDONING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT 
IN BRAZIL 
a. Perceived loss of national autonomy and 
sovereignty I making the government a target for 
nationalistic opposition movements. 
b. Additional confrontation between civilian 
government and the military(increased 
possibility of a coup?). Military resurgence. 
c. Forfeiture of a potentially lucrative export 
market in nuclear and ballistic missile 
technology. 
Brazil did not want to adhere to the strict 
prohibitions concerning the development of nuclear 
technologies. This approach is still considered by the 
military component of Brazilian society but the 
demilitarization process currently underway in Brazilian 
politics has diminished the influence that elements of the 
armed forces had in the formulation of domestic and 
foreign policies in Brazil. Brazil perceived the nuclear 
alternative as a contributing factor in its dream of 
becoming a major regional and global power. This idea is 
still supported by the majority of influential members of 
the Brazilian government but in a much broader context; 
technological autonomy. The nuclear option was understood 
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~o be ~n cor:pl~ance '.dth Br-az~_ developme:1ta~ "gr-and 
str-ategy" 0: d~vers-'-:icat~on of export market5, 50..ir-ce5 of 
energy, socrces of ::ecr.llOlo<jY ane sources of fore'-gn 
invest:Ten~ . 
This past twen::y years r.ave ta'J<;r.t Brazi~ia:1s that a 
comprorr,isin<; a:1d moderate posit-=--on ic :1uc_ea::- IT,atters can 
mitiqate ::he negative effects of pursuing ,,,,hat for ~he 
major-ity of r.a::ior.s i:1 t:le ir.terna::ior.al commucity is a 
controversial option. Poten~ial benef~ts can be obta~ned 
by abandoning N..:clear weapons development. Table IX 
summa::-izes tr.e rrost significant ones. 
TABLE IX 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ABANDONING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
a. Receive economic rewards from the internat~onal 
community, such as: 
- The Enterpr:'se of the Americas initiative 
- Access to technology and investment 
Debt restructuring and increased availabil.:.ty 
of new loans(Brady ?lan) 
b. Comple~e the process of regional economic 
integration begun in the Southern Cone Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) . 
c. Establ':'sh civilian supremacy over the armed 
forces in an area where past military license 
existed. 
d. Build an advance technological base and a more 
prosperous economy with the potential ability to 
renew nuclear weapons research in the near 
future, if the political situation changes. 
e. Adherence to the consensus of powerful 
internationa~ community interest groups. 
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Finally the concept of prestige, synonymous with 
status, which in the Brazilian context is closely related 
to the grandeza{greatness)139 seemed li"e a reasonable goal 
in the days of the economic "miracle". But the rude 
awakening experienced by the Brazilian "dreamers" that 
predicted a regional hegemonic power by the turn of the 
century has created a cautious and pragmatic approach to 
foreign policy and a better understanding of the dynamics 
operating in the international system. The nuclear Bomb 
is as influential in the international scene as it is 
having the potential to develop such a weapon available on 
a short period of time. Brazil does not have to build the 
Bomb, just "play" with that possibility. Its nuclear 
weapons potential is enforced by an articulated and highly 
structured defense arms industry, nuclear technology 
expertise acquired by long time experience with nuclear 
power reactors and associated technologies, and the 
availability of foreign capital(Germany, France, Japan) 
that can be injected to the economy with no immediate 
repercussion in the domestic economic agenda. 
139 Scott D. Tollefson, Brazilian Arms Transfer 
Balli stic Missiles and Foreign Policy: The Search for 
Autonomy,a dissertation submitted to The John Hopkins 
University, Baltimore: Maryland, 1991. Ch.3, p.l2S. 
12. 
A. BRAZIL'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS 
IN THE 90s 
The security interests of Brazil are facing a time of 
opportunity and going through a period of transition in 
this decade. This process can be extended into the early 
years of the 21st century. Some Brazilian foreign policy 
analysts and many economists say that the security 
interest of Brazil would be best served by expanded 
cooperation with the United States.'40 Changes in the 
Brazilian definition of the means for securing its 
national security makes possible a new relationship with 
the U.S .. The traditional binomium Segurallca e 
Desenvolvimento, or security and development has slowly 
evolved into a broader and more inclusive term in order to 
describe the Brazilian national security concept in a 
better way. 
Whereas under the military government the focus of 
Brazilian security policy was on providing the internal 
stability as a precondition of domestic growth, Brazilian 
foreign policy and its security policy component now 
appears to be outward looking. Central to security policy 
is the acquisition of technology. Before a Cabinet 
140 Patrice Franko-Jones,The Brazilian Defense Industry 
Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press 1992, pp.206-209. 
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meeting of 1990, President Co~;_ or de Colello noted that "to 
become a modern, first world nation, 3razi1 must catch C) ;] 
'.~i.th technological ;:>:-ogress . .. 141 The Sec::-etary for 
Strategic Affairs Leone O?amos echoed this sent i ment 
saying that " the Bomb is unnecessary because i:l the 21st 
Ce:ltury tec hno l ogy wil l be the chief mear. of asse::-tir.g 
Nationa l pO -,l.'er . A country wil l be c l assified as 
developed or u nderdevelo;:>ed on the basis of whethe:: it 
absorbs technology or contro l s it ... 1'2 Tr, is emphasis on 
technology is :lot cor.tradictory to ':. he past military 
pol i cy of empr.asiz i ng the economic basesi however, 
achieving this new goa l requi::es a different stra':.egy. 
3::a2i1 r.as learned that it wil l never cat er, u~ :I n 
isolation from the industrialized nations . It, the r efore, 
mus t open further to t:1e inter r.atio na l sys t em to acqui.re, 
develop, and finally produce the latest ':.echnology. 
the te::ms of acqui s ition from indust::ialized coun':.ries 
demand assurances and respon s ible internatio nal b e havior . 
Forei.gn Minis t er Francisco Reze k conte nds that the "Third 
"(Jorld minded " fo re ign policy has been abandoned becaus e 
141 "President Collor Speec h to Congress," (in 
Po r tug·cl es e ), first appearing on Brazilian television Rede 
Gl obo Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 199 0 . T::anslated and 
reported ':' n fJli.§. . (FBIS - LAT - 90 - 247 Decerr..ber 24 , 1 990 . p.30 . 
142 Jornal do Braz:'l , Decembe r 18 , 1990, p.13 . 
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Far-=~ ipat.e i:l t:18 c;e:l:..er t.1C '..r. err.a::io:lal 
Brazil'..ar; 
':"r. :-eCei'le tecl':lOlogy. 
comp: ete ;:or.-p~'o~i::eratio:l 
-:te 
ac;reeme:l-: Uecembe::- 13, ~991 
~jate::-lLl.~s(;.B.;CC-i a:1c tr.e =_z:...::;iI. r.ave Llg::-eed abo'Jt 
CLrrent::'y legislatl:::-e or: both 
r:a-:ions. 144 :::0 ttese importar.t compromises f 
:orme, Preside:1t Collar's ac:::io:l ot [i'_~Lg the 
hole :or f.'.lc]ea::- -:esti:lg was a cramatic sca~.e:ner:L abo.lt 
to greacer trtinsparency 
acr:o.lr.ttibi:;'~~y ~n :lighly tcr::lr.ological a:ld 
:,:"ilitary p::-og::-ams. ForeigG l>lir:is':er Reze:,,- s_1m.ed Ll. 
":Juclcar CO:1:ide:lcc Bu.lldi:lg iG 
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certa.'-:l 
argc:me:l-: to:- -:r.e ?eacefc::" of 
"lar e,.ergy, said -::'1a.t: 
Of course i-: is :lot surprisir_g that t.'J.e c.tir.ister of 
-:he Nil'-'Y, to whom the acq-.lisition 0: s-clbmarine te'cr,TIology 
.'-s critical, publicly cisagreed with Reze . r;:'s ?0s:'..tion -:he 
:oIIO'Ni:lg cay. 'iI'hat was inpertant -:he Coller 




and tl:eir ~nterests. SeCOLd, ""-=--::~ c:.he aS6~sta:1Ce of tl:e 
aLd iLdustr-=--al sector Brazil iar. :.lavy 
slarc:.ec hui d':":l<; t:le f':"rst tf_:-ee ur:~ts of by tf.e 
year 2000, w':"l~ be 3::azi::"s ::irst fleet 0: r:'.1clear 
subf:'arilles. ':'he subITarilles -,o,-i" illitiaLy diese~ 
pO'''Jered, but are being cO:lstructed "'icatior. ::hat 
a: :0'# c:.!1em De cOll'Jerted '::0 ll.1cleac powe:: ~ate:: i:1 
the c.ecade tLe nuclear propulsion sys'::ems .1:,der 
developme:lt a:.. Ipc:::-o{Sao Pau::'o, anG :":le ::::lst':'tute for 
NLclear a:1d Resea:-ch (:PEN) :n Sao ?au:o ace 
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i::s 
_ee..::- p:'ogra:':1s. Jr . . :;-1..:1y 9, :992 B::-azi_ a:ld Gennacy 
plar.:: 
58')0 
in f'.1nds origically ag:::eed for 
bo"Ct hngra-J and 2, no'." e..~lccated sole~y for Angra-2. 
\10rk on site carry 0.1:: jointly German dnd 
been 
and ;:< aced ina oper-at:onc::" sLatt.:.s, stiL. 
severa:" faeiL.ties and r_eavy macjinery tr.at eC.1:"d De 
p~aced ir_ cO!rlll:"ssio:1 in a S:lO!:'t period 01 ":ime. 
add'.tic::J to these recent decisions c:nd political 
'la:1el:\'er-s, Br-a3il still has not sig)"Jed the :--'<lclear 
?roli:eration Treaty ("fPT) I and the Saieguards Agreeme:1t 
for the 1"·.1C:Ud'-- Inspectioc of nuclear facilities ",ith 
;,rc;,e:1tina .las r.ot been rat.ified yet 81' t.r.e Brazil:"an 
Cong:::ess. ?u:"l adje:c-ence to the T1ate~o Leo '::reaty :las not 
been acknow:"Acged by ":he gove:::-:1ment of new P:::-esident 
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:tamar Franco. On December 1992, the Brazilian Nuclear 
Energy Association(ABEN) urged President Franco not to 
ratify the agreement between Argentina, Brazil, and the 
IAEA because it will allow for inspection of the Brazilian 
military nuclear program. ABEN claimed the agreement 
would be harmful to Brazilian national sovereignty. 147 
Other legislative elements in Brazilian political society 
and powerful interest groups are now sharing this point of 
view. Their influence will playa key role for the future 
of any nuclear ambitions of Brazilian policy makers. 
147 "Nuclear Related Trade and Cooperation Developments" 
Eye on Supply, Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project, 
Monterey: CA, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
(Number 9, Fall 1993), p.l. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Sr-az i l i an current strategy in matters concerning 
nuclear '",eapon' s technology seem t o be summarized by t :le 
fo rmer :oreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira '.'!ho in 
1990 trenchan~ ly o~served: 
"D"Jring the Cold ' ... 'ar , a rigid alignment '.ifith 
the l eader of t;,e 'rJestern Bl oc ''''a s r equ ired 
of tp.e na>:ions o f the deve l opi ng world that 
sr,ared t::le basic values of the 'dest. These 
realit i es no longer app l y . . (and) an emergent 
power with a wide r-ange of inter-es ts in many 
fields cannot allow rigid a l ign:lents, rooted 
':'~r~~e s~:~~: J-4~ limit her actions in th e 
The :uilitary ir.fluence in Brazil's political arena 
appears to be increasing as the economic situation na rro''''£ 
the viable alternat':ves to find a so l ution >:0 the 
Brazilian socio- ecor,omical crisis and corrupt ior, scandals 
weaken the c ivilian leadership. If in fact a military 
resurgence is t o be experienced in Brazil's near future , 
then the possibilities of a fully implerr,ented and 
functional nuclear weapons program, reinforcing 
nationalistic :pride and regiona l military superior i ty, 
cou l d become a rea l i t:y . 
148 Will iam Perry and Sheila Kern. "The Brazilian 
Nuclear Program In a Foreign Policy Context," in Comoarative 
~, (Volume 1, Number 1\21978), p . 56. 
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A new "World Order", with new political, ideological, 
economic, and social challenges in the context of a new 
international polity, is affecting the intellectual and 
political sector of all civilized societies. These new 
events and different political dynamics are now changing 
old concepts of national security and reinforcing 
nationalistic concerns involved in the formulation of a 
coherent foreign policy. Brazil is no exception. 
of nuclear proliferation and technological autonomy are 
here to stay, especially in developing countries. 
Geopolitical solutions to international concerns are as 
good as the commitment of the parties involved to let the 
safeguard mechanisms of the international community verify 
inter-regional or bilateral arrangements. Under these 
conditions the ABACC could prove to be a reliable source 
of nuclear control and verification of safety guidelines 
and a model to follow for other nations outside the NPT. 
But, as discussed previously, the process is structurally 
complicated and requires careful implementation. lAEA and 
other mechanism of non-proliferation are effective but not 
infallible. A veiled nuclear program could escape 
detailed international scrutiny. 
The future of the Brazilian weapons program is 
unclear; intentions are hard to understand. But what is 
133 
unclouded is that Brazil will continue "playing" its 
nuclear option without compromising the position of the 
government :.oward one extreme or the other. To completely 
renounce the nuclear option is not a recommended 
alternative because of geopolitical concerns (security), 
strong military oppOSition, it opposes issues of 
territorial control included in the Doctrine of National 
Security and Development, it disregards international 
"prestige" considerations, and more importantly its 
negative implication to future efforts of achieving 
technological autonomy. In addition, economic constraints 
can be avoided. Foreign financial support to continue the 
development of nuclear programs is available through old 
creditors and new clients. To openly embrace a nuclear 
weapons program and begin a race toward the development of 
a nuclear bomb do not offer a better solution because 
immediate economic considerations, international 
pressures (possibility of sanctions) imposed by the 
international community, and its damaging effect to 
regional cooperation and integration efforts. The 
Brazilian understanding of the options available to their 
policy-makers will continue to be a matter of controversy. 
Brazil appears to be "playing the nuclear game" one day at 
a time f and no one knows the aces left in its hand. The 
13. 
ill'Jsior. of stL.l ha'i:'ng some aces ':'eft :.:;:eep tJ.e p':'ayer Q<l 
:::le table, in the cer.ter of t:le gaIT,e. Brazil urcie:-star.ds 
::t.'..s s::atus. 
The :':lterra::'.onal imp':"ications arising from this 
behavior reqc.ires from the wo:cld leade:cs, ar.d tl-.e 
prir.cipal suppo::-ters of disar:na;-:-,ent anci non-proliferation 
effo::-ts to understa:ld po',.,rer poL.::ics and stra::egic 
':'r.ten::ions wi::hi:l :::'1e context of B::-azilia:l :::oreign policy. 
Pr.lcier.t a:ld ca'.:.tious be.'1avior ',·,hi':'e r.on-proiiferat.'..on 
efforts a:ld negotiations cor.tir.ue are necessary elements 
::0 ::-eer.fo::-ce tr.e tr.ls:: be::ween Br-azilia:1 au"thorities a:ld 
"the member-s 0::: the In::ernational corr.:llc.nity. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO TRANSPORT NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS IN AND THROUGH TERRITORIES WITHIN THE ZONE 
OF APPLICATION OF THE TREATY OF TIATELOLCO 
T~e United States insisted on the following inter-pretation 
of the transit rights under the Treaty of Tlatelolco: 
The proposed treaty should impose no prohibition that 
would restrict the freedom of transit [of nuclear 
weapons 1 wi thin the Western Hemisphere. The U. s. 
policy on freedom of transit is based on our national 
security needs and the vital security needs of the 
Hemisphere. 149 
The United States faced considerable opposition on the 
transit issue. Mexico stated that this interpretation 
undermined the entire purpose of the treaty. However, the 
firm U. s. pOSition ensured that the final compromise allowed 
each nation in Latin America the "discretion" to permit the 
transit of atomic materials through its territory. The u.s. 
policy of ""neither confirming or denying"" the presence of 
nuclear weapons on any of its ships or aircraft traveling 
through Latin America has continued. Some opposition to 
u.s. Navy ship visits exists in Latin America, but, it has 
been far less vocal than in other parts of the world. There 
has not been any confrontation in Latin America comparable 
to New Zealand's 1985 decision to refuse ship visits by 
nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered ships. lS0 
149U. S . Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Additional Protocol I To The Treaty For The Prohibition Of 
Nuclear Weapons In Latin America (95th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 15 August 1978), p.47. 
150Jacob Bercovitch, ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance 
Management in International Affairs (New York: St. Martin 
Press, 1988), pp.1-29. 
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APPENDIX B 
BRAZ g - GOVERNMENT 





Constitution-October 5 198a} 
PRESIDENT- Itamar C. Franco 
FINANCE MINISTER- Henrique Cardoso 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
(PMOB), Liberal Front Party (PFL) { 
workers Party (PTJ, Brazilian Labor 
Party (PTB) t and Democratic Workers 
Party (PDT) 






















0.3% of GNP 
Portuguese(official) , English, 
German, Italian 
Roman Catholic (89%) 
76% 
64 Male, 69 Female 
67/l000 births 
BRAZIL - FINANCE 
Monetary Unit 
GNP 1991 (in millions $) 








Steel, autos, ships, 
appliances, petrochemicals, 
Chromium, iron, manganese, 
diamonds, gold, nickel, tin, 
bauxite, oil, gem stones 
Oil Reserves 1987 2.3 billions of barrels 
Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992, Pharos 
Books, scripps Howard Company, New York: N. Y. , 
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